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CHAPTER 1 
 PAY-AS-YOU-GO PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the time-frame of a century, the social security system has emerged as a powerful 
institution, one that has played a complex yet important role in the evolution of most developed 
countries. Currently, nearly 150 countries offer some sort of old-age pension for its citizens. In a 
stylized sense, the financing of the old-age pension system can occur in two different ways. First, 
the system can be funded, implying that the mandatory contributions of the young are invested 
today and returned to them with interest in the next period. Second, the system can be unfunded, 
implying pensions to the current retired, old are financed by contributions from the young and 
working generation period by period. Accordingly, the latter system is usually referred to as a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system. 
Most countries that offer a public retirement provision finance these transfers on a PAYG 
basis. Nevertheless, the rationale for such a system -- even whether it ought to be introduced -- 
continues to be hotly debated among policymakers. Alongside the policy dimensions of the debate, 
the consequences of PAYG programs are also a disputed subject within the realm of economic 
models. In particular, the rationale for such programs in the theoretical literature is not clear-cut. 
For instance, within a standard overlapping generations (OG) model where the young supply their 
labor inelastically and the old are retired, a well-established result is that a PAYG system will 
reduce the incentive to save and thereby reduce capital accumulation (see Diamond (1965) for the 
original analysis). In contrast, the funded pension system has no effect on aggregate saving and 
capital accumulation. In short, the funded system is neutral but the PAYG system is not. Attached 
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to this neutrality result is a classic result regarding desirability. If long-run (or steady-state) welfare 
is the criterion, then it is well-known that if the economy is initially dynamically efficient -- the 
net interest rate is greater than the population growth rate -- then there is no welfare case for 
introducing a PAYG system (see Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975)). And as documented in 
Aaron (1966) and Abel et al. (1989), most developed countries are dynamically efficient. By 
implication, a PAYG system in these countries is not desirable and a funded system is preferred. 
Despite this, most countries have implemented (or are considering implementing) pension 
programs with a substantial PAYG component. The literature has offered several justifications. 
For example, the role played by unfunded pension systems in ameliorating idiosyncratic risks in 
worlds with incomplete financial markets has been surveyed in Krueger (2006). Andersen and 
Bhattacharya (2011) and Caliendo and Gahramanov (2011) study the importance of agent myopia 
in providing a justification for such pension systems. Fuster et al. (2007) introduce bidirectional 
altruism along with mortality and earnings risks in a framework similar to one adopted by Conesa 
and Krueger (1999). Cooley and Soares (1999) explore a political-economy justification for PAYG 
pensions. 
Most of these studies, however, take us far away from the world of the baseline Diamond 
model by introducing many different additional features. Clean insights are lost in the process. In 
this paper, we return to the original spirit of the Diamond (1965) model and uncover a novel 
channel of justifying PAYG pensions therein. This way we use the cleanest possible environment 
to capture all equilibrium responses. Our focus on the pension role of social security prevents the 
analysis from getting confounded with all other roles of social security (such as, its redistribution 
or insurance role). 
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Recall that in the standard Diamond OG model, and in much of the ensuing literature, it is 
assumed agents work full time when young and retire at the beginning of the second period of their 
life. In other words, their old-age labor supply is arbitrarily fixed at zero, implying retirement is 
exogenously imposed. This assumption is especially troublesome since it is readily apparent that 
retirement decisions are not made in a vacuum and clearly respond to the pension system itself. In 
this paper, we introduce an endogenous retirement decision in the second period of life, leaving 
other elements of the Diamond (1965) environment intact.1 We start with a very general 
formulation of the environment, i.e., a time-separable utility function, a neoclassical production 
function, and a PAYG governmental budget constraint. Indeed, one of the unique elements of our 
analysis is the broad generality of the environment. Many partial and general-equilibrium results 
are derived within this setting. In places, however, tractability is achieved by assuming C.E.S 
preferences. 
Within this new framework, several results regarding the effects of introducing a PAYG 
system on the capital-labor ratio and on long-run welfare are derived. First, in a general 
environment with endogenous retirement, the effect of a PAYG system on the capital-labor ratio 
is ambiguous -- it may be decreasing, increasing or even neutral. Second, in the case of CES utility, 
the effect of a PAYG system on the capital-labor ratio only depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between consumptions in both periods and old-age leisure. Specifically, if the elasticity of 
substitution is equal to one, i.e., with logarithmic utility, introducing a PAYG system is perfectly 
neutral in terms of the capital-labor ratio. Third, it is also shown that there may be long-run welfare 
                                                 
1 There have been a few studies on the relationship between endogenous labor supply and social security. For example, 
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2013) allow for endogenous labor supply in the first period of life and show that, under 
a sufficient condition, the old agents are no less risk-averse than the young, the Aaron-Samuelson result still holds. 
Hu (1979) and Michel and Pestieau (1999) introduce endogenous retirement in the second period. Hu (1979) shows 
that with a bequest motive, the impact of an increase in retirement benefits on capital accumulation is ambiguous. 
Michel and Pestieau (1999) find the rate of participation declines as the size of social security system increases. 
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gains from introducing a PAYG pension if the initial steady-state is dynamically efficient. The 
results regarding the welfare effects crucially depend on how the capital-labor ratio changes. 
These results serve to extend our understanding of the role played by PAYG systems. The 
main insight is, in a model with endogenous retirement, changes in the capital-labor ratio depend 
not only on how saving responds to the pension system, but also on how older workers adjust their 
labor supply -- their decision on when to retire -- in response to the system itself. It is this latter 
effect that has been ignored in the literature. With a distorting payroll tax used to finance such a 
system, it is possible for old workers to change their labor supply and even bring about an increase 
in the capital-labor ratio, which, in turn, may raise long-run welfare if the economy is initially 
dynamically efficient. These results are in sharp contrast to those known for many decades in the 
literature. 
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the environment of the 
model, a generalization of Diamond (1965) to endogenous retirement. In section 1.3 we study the 
behavior of the consumer. Section 1.4 describes the general equilibrium and the effect of the 
PAYG system on the capital-labor ratio. In section 1.5 we analyze the welfare effects, and section 
1.6 provides concluding remarks. Proofs of all major results can be found in the appendices. 
 
1.2 The Model 
 
1.2.1 Preliminaries 
The economy is closed and consists of firms, an infinite sequence of two period lived 
overlapping generations, an initial old generation, and an infinitely lived government. Let 
1, 2,...t =  index time. At each date t , a new generation composed of a continuum of identical 
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young agents appears. Population is assumed to be stationary and the number of individuals in 
each generation is normalized to one. 
Identical firms hire the available labor force tL , and the aggregate capital stock tK , to 
produce the aggregate output. Production occurs according to a neoclassical production function 
( , )t tF K L , exhibiting constant returns to scale. The homogenous output can be used both as a 
consumption good and as an investment good. The capital stock is assumed to depreciate 
completely in each period.2 Hence, investment in period t  determines the capital stock in period 
1t + , i.e., 1t tI K += . The initial old agents are endowed with 1K  units of capital. Let /t t tk K L≡  
denote the capital-labor ratio. Output per unit of labor is ( ) ( )/ ,1t t tf k F K L≡  where ( )tf k  is the 
intensive production function. The standard neoclassical assumptions for the production function 
apply, i.e., for all 0k > , 0f ′ > , 0f ′′ < , and the Inada conditions hold. 
Firms are assumed to maximize profits, given by { }( , )t t t t t tF K L w L R K− − , where tw and 
tR  are respectively the competitive wage rate and the gross real return between 1t −  and t . As 
markets are perfectly competitive, the input factors are rewarded by their marginal products:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,t t t t tw w k f k k f k′≡ = −   (1.1) 
 ( ) ( ).t t tR R k f k′≡ =   (1.2) 
Notice that  ( ) 0tw k′ > , and that ( ) 0tR k′ < . 
Now, let's turn to the consumers. Individuals live for two periods and they are endowed 
with one unit of labor in each period. In their first period they are young and inelastically supply 
one unit of labor. In their second period they are old and care about leisure. Hence, old agents 
                                                 
2 As one period represents about 35 years, it is reasonable to assume that the depreciation rate is 1. 
6 
 
make a trade-off between leisure and consumption. The portion of their old age devoted to leisure 
is called retirement. Let  ( )1, 2, 1t tc c +  denote the consumption of the final good at date t  (date 1t +  
) by a representative young (old) agent born at t . Let  [ ]1 0,1tl + ∈  denote the labor supply by an old 
agent at time 1t + . The length of time, 11 tl +− , is termed retirement and is endogenously 
determined. Preferences are given by a time-separable utility function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1, 2, 1 1 1, 2, 1 1, , 1 ,t t t t t tU c c l u c v c h lβ µ+ + + + ≡ + + −    (1.3) 
where β  is a discount factor, and µ  measures the weight of leisure in the second period of life. It 
is assumed that u , v  and h  are each twice continuously differentiable. Moreover, 0u u′ ′′> > , 
0v v′ ′′> >  and 0h h′ ′′> > . For future reference, define the various Arrow-Pratt measures of 
relative risk aversion to be: 
 ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1
;  ;  .
1u v l
c u c c v c l h l
u c v c h l
′′ ′′ ′′− −
Φ ≡ − Φ ≡ − Φ ≡ −
′ ′ ′ −
  (1.4) 
 
1.2.2 Equilibrium conditions 
There are three markets in this economy. Equilibrium in the labor market in period t , is 
given by 1t tL l= + , as the young individuals supply one unit of labor, and the old individuals 
supply tl . Since labor is homogeneous, the wage rate is the same for young and old at any point in 
time. A young agent born at date t  inelastically supply one unit of labor in a competitive labor 
market and earns a wage tw , and when old, the individual chooses how much labor to supply at 
the then current wage, 1tw + . 
In the capital market, the aggregate saving of the young in any period, becomes the start-
of-period capital for the next period. Hence, the equilibrium condition in the capital market is given 
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by 1t tK s+ = , where ts  is aggregate savings. Using the definition of k  we can rewrite this as 
1 1t t tk L s+ + = . Moreover, by combining this with the equilibrium condition on the labor market, 
equilibrium in the capital market becomes: 
 ( )1 11 .t t tl k s+ ++ =   (1.5) 
Equation (1.5) relates capital intensity, savings and optimal labor supply by the elderly. According 
to Walras law in period t , equilibrium in the labor market and in the capital market implies 
equilibrium in the output market, which is given by 1, 2, 1t t t tY c c K += + + . 
 
1.2.3 Pensions 
The PAYG pension scheme is run by the government. At any date t , it levies a payroll tax 
tτ  on each young and old worker to finance a lump-sum transfer tB  to each of the currently retired. 
In the model economy, retirement is imposed as a pre-condition to receive pensions. This 
specification fits well with current practice in a number of countries where there are double taxes 
on continued work: the payroll tax t t tw lτ  and the forgone pension benefits t tB l . In every period, 
the government balances the tax income and the social security benefit in a PAYG program. The 
balanced budget scheme is thus given by:  
 ( )1 .t t t t t t tl B w w lτ τ− = +   (1.6) 
The left hand side represents the pension benefits paid to current retirees and the right hand side 
captures the total social security tax revenue, t twτ  from young agents and t t tw lτ  from current old 
workers. 
Here, the old agent contributes to his own pension. This makes the formulation a bit 
different from the standard one where only the current young contribute to the pension for the 
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current, retired old. Also, as all this is happening within the same period, the agent does not earn 
any interest on his old-age contributions. 
To understand how the PAYG social security system affects the capital-labor ratio and 
long-run welfare, it is crucial to understand how the consumers behave. In the next section we 
therefore solve the agent's problem and explore how the agent's optimal savings and labor supply 
respond to ceteris-paribus changes in the PAYG system. 
 
1.3 Individual's Problem 
Recall that an individual born in period t  inelastically supply one unit of labor. The 
resulting labor income is allocated to first period consumption, savings and tax contributions. 
Thus:  
 ( )1, 1 .t t t tc w sτ= − −   (1.7)  
In period 1t + , the individual can consume out of accumulated savings, the income earned while 
working, and the pension benefit while retired. Accordingly:  
 ( ) ( )2, 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 .t t t t t t t tc R s w l B lτ+ + + + + + += + − + −   (1.8) 
The problem of an agent born at time t , taking 1 1 1, , , ,t t t t tw w Rτ τ + + +  and 1tB +  as given, is written as: 
[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1, 2, 1 1
1, 2, 1 1 1, 2, 1 10, 0, 0,1
max , , 1 ,
t t t
t t t t t tc c l
U c c l u c v c h lβ µ
+ +
+ + + +≥ ≥ ∈
 = + + −   
subject to (1.7) and (1.8). It is assumed that the individuals do not perceive a link between their 
social security contributions and the benefits they will receive. 
By inserting the budget constraints in (1.7) and (1.8) into the utility function, the problem 
becomes: 
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1,
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
max 1
1 1 1 .
t t
t t ts l
t t t t t t t t
U u w s
v R s w l B l h l
τ
β τ µ
+
+ + + + + + +
⋅ = − −
 + + − + − + − 
 
Assuming interior solutions, the first order conditions with respect to savings and labor 
supply are given by: 
 ( ) ( )1, 1 2, 1: 0,t t t ts u c R v cβ + +′ ′− + =   (1.9) 
and  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 2, 1 1: 1 1 0.t t t t t tl w B v c h lτ µ+ + + + + +′ ′− − − − =     (1.10)  
The second order conditions are satisfied by the quasi-concavity assumption of ( )U ⋅ . 
Equation (1.9) implies that the marginal rate of substitution of young-age consumption for 
old-age consumption equals the discount factor, 
1
1
tR +
. This is the same as in the standard Diamond 
model. Equation (1.10) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between old-age consumption 
and leisure equals the price of lengthening retirement, ( )1 1 11t t tw Bτ+ + +− − . Solving (1.9) and (1.10), 
we can write the optimal savings and labor supply functions as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 , 1 , , ; 1 , 1 , , .t t t t t t t t t t t t t ts s w w R B l l w w R Bτ τ τ τ+ + + + + + + + += − − = − −  
We derive several results regarding individual's behavior in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1.1 (a) 1 20 1, 0s s< < < , and the signs of 3s  and 4s  are ambiguous.    
(b) 1 3 40, 0, 0l l l< < < , and the sign of 2l  is ambiguous. 
The proof of Lemma 1.1 is in Appendix 1.A. Let us briefly look at the intuitions behind 
the results in Lemma 1.1. 
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(i) The effects of current net wage rate ( )1t tw τ− : the young-age labor supply is fixed at 
one, thus a change in the current net wage rate only causes an income effect. Accordingly, with a 
higher income in young age, agents save more when young, and work less when old. 
(ii) The effects of future net wage rate ( )1 11t tw τ+ +− : a decrease in the old-age net wage 
reduce future income. Since the individual has a preference for consumption smoothing, this 
causes the agent to save more. However, when the second period labor supply is endogenous, the 
effect of a change in the old-age net wage is not clear-cut. A reduction in the net wage will 
according to the substitution effect imply less labor supply, but according to the income effect 
imply an increase in labor supply. 
(iii) The effects of interest rate 1tR + : changing the interest rate causes both income and 
substitution effects on savings. An increase in the interest rate will according to the substitution 
effect increase savings, but according to the income effect reduce savings. Hence, the total effect 
is ambiguous. For the labor supply, an increase in the interest rate increases the lifetime income 
and the income effect will reduce the labor supply in the old age. 
(iv) The effects of pension level 1tB + : because agents can get higher pensions after 
retirement, they have less incentive to work and thus will retire earlier. But even though they work 
less in the second period, the old age wealth will increase, so the agents save less. 
Lemma 1.1 shows that for several cases, changes in the interest rate and the net wage, will 
cause substitution and income effects that may work in opposite directions. Due to these unclear 
effects, the following assumptions will be made in the remainder of the paper. Firstly, the 
substitution effect of an interest rate increase dominates the income effect. As seen later, this 
implies that optimal saving is increasing in its return. Secondly, the substitution effect of an 
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increase in the net wage dominates the income effect. It implies that optimal old-age labor supply 
is rising in the second period wage and falling in the second period tax rate.3 
These assumptions are ensured by the following restrictions for any [ ]0,1τ ∈  at any period: 
Assumption 1.1 ( ) ( ) 0.v Rsv′ ′′⋅ + ⋅ ≥   
Assumption 1.2 ( ) ( )( ) 0.v v l wτ′ ′′⋅ + ⋅ + ≥  
Thus far we have studied the first order responses of savings and labor supply. It is clear 
that a PAYG pension program can affect the capital-labor ratio through several channels, and we 
can distinguish between direct and indirect effects. In each period, the changes in tax rates and 
pension levels will change young agents' savings and old agents' labor supply -- these are direct 
effects. There are also indirect effects through factor prices. As the capital-labor ratio changes, the 
wage rates and the interest rate will change, which in turn affect the agents' behavior. Moreover, 
there is always a link between social security taxes and the benefits if the government runs a 
balanced budget constraint. With this in mind, we proceed to study the general equilibrium 
responses in the next section.           
                    
1.4 General Equilibrium 
In this section, we study the effects of increasing the size of a PAYG pension system in a 
general equilibrium. The government's budget constraint is given by equation (1.6). Solving for 
,B  the one-period forward formulation becomes:  
 ( )1 1 11
1
1
.
1
t t t
t
t
w l
B
l
τ + + +
+
+
+
=
−
  (1.11) 
                                                 
3 These assumptions are commonly made and supported by several empirical studies (see Boskin 1978, Ashenfelter 
and Heckman, 1974). 
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If the government runs a balanced budget, a change in old-age wage rate 1tw + or old-age tax rate 
1tτ +  will affect savings and labor supply through the pension channel as well. Notice that although 
tτ , tw  and 1tR +  are not shown in (1.11), they will also affect the benefits through old-age labor 
supply. For example, as young-age wage rate increases, savings are raised and old-age labor supply 
is reduced (Lemma 1.1). The latter causes the benefits to decrease because the government collects 
less tax from the old workers. 
Henceforward, we assume a constant tax policy, tτ τ=  for all t . The capital accumulation 
equation (1.5), together with the factor market equilibrium conditions (1.1) and (1.2), implies the 
equilibrium law of motion for the capital-labor ratio, given 0 0k > : 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 11 , , , , , , .t t t t t t tk l w k w k R k s w k w k R kτ τ+ + + + + + = 
 
  (1.12) 
where ( )1 1, , ,t t ts w w Rτ + +

 and ( )1 1, , ,t t tl w w Rτ + +

, denotes the general equilibrium savings and labor 
supply respectively. By using (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11), optimal savings and labor supply in general 
equilibrium, can be solved from the following two equations by using: 
 ( )( ) ( )11 1 1 11 0,t t tt t t t tu w s R v R s w l wτ β τ++ + + +′ ′− − − + + + =
  
  (1.13) 
 ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 1
1
21 1 0.
1
t t tt t t t
t
w v R s w l w h l
l
τ τ µ+ ++ + + +
+
  ′ ′− + + − − = − 
  
   (1.14) 
For future use, we collect some results in Lemma 1.2: 
Lemma 1.2 Given assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, 
 (a) 1 10, 0, 0t t tw w Rs s s+ +> < >
  
, and the sign of sτ

 is ambiguous. 
 (b) 1 10, 0, 0t t tw w Rl l l+ +< > <
  
, and the sign of lτ

 is ambiguous.  
The proof of Lemma 1.2 is in Appendix 1.B. 
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In the remainder of the paper, we are more interested in a special case -- the steady-state 
equilibrium. Specifically, for a given τ , the capital-labor ratio k  is stationary and satisfies: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , , , , .k l w k R k s w k R kτ τ + = 
 
  (1.15)   
It is assumed that a steady-state k  exists. The conditions needed to ensure existence are 
straightforward and discussed in Nourry (2001). 
 
1.4.1 Neutrality of the PAYG system 
Recall that the purpose of this paper is to study the effect of a PAYG system on capital 
intensity and welfare. With respect to capital intensity, we are particularly interested in the possible 
neutrality of a PAYG system. To proceed, apply the law of motion for the capital-labor ratio, and 
examine the overall effects of τ  on the steady-state k . Equation (1.15) gives us 
 
( ) ( )
,
1 w R w Rk k k k
dk s kl
d l k l w l R s w s R
τ τ
τ
−
=
+ + + − +
 
    
  (1.16) 
where 1 steady-statet tw w ws s s +≡ +
  
, and 1 steady-statet tw w wl l l +≡ +
  
. 
According to Lemma 1.2, the sign of (1.16) is indeterminate in this general set up. 
However, we can determine the sign of the denominator, by applying Samuelson's correspondence 
principle. This principle suggests a link between the stability properties of a steady-state and its 
comparative statics properties. 
The stability properties of a steady-state equilibrium are studied in the following manner. 
Taking the derivative with respect to tk  on both sides of (1.12) and reorganizing yields: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1
11
1 1 1 1 1 1
.
1
t t
t t t t
w wt k tt
t w R w Rt t k t k t k t k t
s k l w kdk
dk l k l w k l R k s w k s R k+ + + +
++
+ + + + + +
−
=
+ + + − +
 
    
  (1.17) 
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According to Lemma 1.2, both the numerator and denominator of (1.17) are positive. Around a 
locally stable steady-state, we have 1 1t
t k
dk
dk
+ <  , which gives us 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1 11 0t t t t t tw w R w w Rk k k k
k
l k l l w l R s s w s R+ + + ++ + + + − + + >
      
, 
and further as 
( ) ( )1 0w R w Rk k k k
k
l k l w l R s w s R+ + + − + >
    
. 
We can then establish the following lemmas. 
Lemma 1.3 At a (locally) stable steady-state, and given assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, the following 
holds:  
( ) ( )1 0.w R w Rk k k kl k l w l R s w s R+ + + − + >
    
 
Hence, the denominator of (1.16) is positive. 
Lemma 1.4 dkdτ  has the same sign as s klτ τ−
 
. 
So to evaluate the effects of a PAYG pension system and the possibility of neutrality, it is 
necessary to determine the sign of ( s klτ τ−
 
). As stated earlier, the signs of sτ

 and lτ

 are not 
determinate, which implies that even at a stable steady-state, we cannot sign /dk dτ . 
At this stage, it is instructive to pause briefly and consider what is known from a standard 
Diamond model. In such a model, where young agents work one unit of time and old agents are 
retired the entire second period, a well-known result is that a PAYG system will always reduce the 
incentive to save and thereby reduce capital accumulation at a stable steady-state (see Blanchard 
and Fischer, 1989). If we retain the same notation but set 0l ≡ , the felicities will only depend on 
consumptions when young and old. We can then show that (1.16) reduces to:  
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( )
.
1 w Rk k
dk s
d s w s R
τ
τ
=
− +

 
 
Using the first order condition  
( )( ) ( )1 0,u w s Rv Rs wτ β τ′ ′− − − + + =   
we can derive 0sτ <

 and 0ws <

. Besides, under Assumption 1.1, 0Rs >

 and since 0kw >  and 
0kR < , we get 
( ) 0.dksign sign s
d
τ
τ
  = < 
 

 
The implication is clear, a PAYG system is never neutral in the standard Diamond model. 
But in the presence of endogenous retirement, a PAYG system will not only affect saving 
but also the old-age labor supply. And since there are countervailing effects in this set-up, it is by 
no means clear-cut how the capital-labor ratio will be affected. All sorts of possibilities, including 
full neutrality, may emerge, as will be evident from the specific example presented in the next 
section. 
 
1.4.2 CES utility 
In this section we look at the special case with a CES utility function. With this 
specification, we get analytical results for all feasible τ . The utility functions are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 .
1
u x v x h x x γ
γ
−= = =
−
 
Then 0u v l γΦ = Φ = Φ = >  where γ  is the elasticity of marginal utility. Our purpose is to 
evaluate s klτ τ−
 
. Using the expressions for sτ

 and lτ

 evaluated at the steady-state, and combined 
with the CES utility function, we obtain (see Appendix 1.C):  
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 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 12 22 22 1 12 1 1 1 1 11
steady-state
2 2
1 1wcl l l l ll R RR wv
s
c D
γ γτ τ τ
τ
β β γγβ
−
− − − − −−
 + − − + + −′  
=
    


  (1.18) 
and 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
2
2 22
1 1
steady-state
2 2
1 1R R Rw cl lRR wvl
c D
γ γβ βτ
τ
γγβ
− −
− −
+ − −′
=
 

  (1.19) 
where 2D  is defined in Appendix 1.B. With CES utility functions, one of the first order conditions 
in steady-state is: 
( ) ( ) ( )11 w s R Rs wl wγτ β τ−− − = + +   , 
from which we can solve 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
1
w R wl w
s
R R
γ
γ
τ β τ
β
−
−
− − +
=
+


. 
Thus the capital-labor ratio is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
1
1
1
1 1 1
w R wl wsk
l R R l
γ
γ
τ β τ
β
−
−
− − +
= =
+ + +




  (1.20) 
By combining this with the resource constraint of the economy, we derive the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1.1 Under CES utility with 0,u v l γΦ = Φ = Φ = >  
( )
0 if 1
sign sign 1 0 if 1
0 if 1
dk
d
γ
γ γ
τ
γ
> <
= − = =
< >
. 
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The proof of Proposition 1.1 is in Appendix 1.D. Thus, the effect of the PAYG contribution 
rate only depends on the elasticity of marginal utility. Notice that this proposition applies for the 
whole range of τ . 
As shown above, in the standard Diamond model, a PAYG system is never neutral. An 
increase in the size of the system necessarily reduces capital formation. This is the original concern 
with PAYG systems. Here, if endogenous retirement is taken into account, we find introducing a 
PAYG pension can reduce the capital stock, increase the capital stock, or even be neutral. With 
CES utility, the effect of the PAYG contribution rate would rely totally on the size of γ  relative 
to 1. In the often studied case with log utility, 1γ = , and it follows that / 0dk dτ = . The implication 
is startling: if preferences conform to the commonly studied logarithmic utility, introducing a 
PAYG system is exactly neutral. 
Another unconventional result can also be derived from Proposition 1.1. Notice that a 
sufficient condition for Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 to hold is 1vΦ ≤ . Hence, since 
1,v γΦ = ≤  one can derive / 0dk dτ ≥  with no additional constraints on the preferences than just 
CES utility. Rather than being a source of concern, in this case, a PAYG system can even help to 
expand capital formation. 
In Diamond (1965), a PAYG system reduces the capital stock and via that channel, reduces 
steady-state welfare if the economy is not overaccumulating capital to begin with. And since most 
countries do not overaccumulate capital, the PAYG system weakens the welfare. The potential to 
overturn this line of logic is now possible. In the model with endogenous retirement, under some 
circumstances, a PAYG system can help to expand capital formation. If the economy is initially 
dynamically efficient, this helps to cause the rate of return on capital to converge to the Golden 
Rule level, which increases the long-run welfare of the individuals. However, from equation 
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(1.14), it is apparent that an increase in the size of the pension program will distort, causing the 
marginal rate of substitution between old-age consumption and leisure (retirement) to diverge from 
the wage rate, and reducing welfare. Whether the total effect on welfare is positive depends on 
whether the increased dynamic efficiency exceeds the static inefficiency it brings about, and that 
is the subject of the next section. 
 
1.5 Welfare 
Here we study the effect of implementing a pension system on the long-run (steady-state) 
equilibrium level of utility enjoyed by a representative agent. In the standard Diamond model, a 
PAYG system can never be Pareto-improving in a dynamically efficient economy. The initial 
generation gains, but future generations lose. This is because for future generations the rate of 
return on the taxes they pay when young is 1 (assuming no population growth), whereas their own 
saving via capital would have generated a return of  1R > . Thus each future generation incurs a 
loss because it receives a return 1 on the social security taxes which is less than the return R  it 
would earn by investing those funds in capital. In the standard Diamond model, therefore, whether 
the PAYG system is desirable depends only on whether the economy is dynamically efficient or 
not. Once endogenous retirement is introduced, matters are far more complicated because of the 
presence of another effect: agents modify their old-age labor supply in response to the pension 
program. In this section, we study this combined effect on welfare. 
The government is assumed to be benevolent. It chooses τ  to maximize the utility of an 
agent in a steady-state equilibrium. The government's problem is written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2max 1U u c v c h lτ τ τ β τ βµ τ= + + −             (1.21)  
with 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 , ,c w k s w k R kτ τ τ τ τ τ= − −          

, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )2 , , , ,c R k s w k R k w k l w k R k w kτ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ= + +                          
 
, 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, ,l l w k R kτ τ τ τ=       

. 
Differentiating (1.21) with respect to τ  and reorganizing, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
2 1 2
1
1 ,
k k k k
dU dkwu c v c w w u c v c R s w l w
d d
d s dlv c R u c v c w h l
d d
β τ β τ
τ τ
β β µ
τ τ
 ′ ′ ′ ′= − + + − + + + 
 ′ ′ ′ ′+ − + − −    
 
 

 
where 
( )w Rk kd s dks s w s Rd dττ τ= + +

  
, 
( )w Rk kdl dkl l w l Rd dττ τ= + +

  
. 
From the first order conditions (1.13) and (1.14), we know that ( ) ( )1 2u c Rv cβ′ ′=  and 
( ) ( ) ( )2 211 1lw v c h lτ µ− ′ ′− = −

. Also, k kw kR= −  and (1 )s l k= +
 
. By exploiting these relations, the 
effect of  τ  can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
21 1 1
1k
dU dk dlw R v c k R R v c wv c
d d dl
τβ τ β β
τ τ τ
′ ′ ′= − + − − +
−

 . 
Evaluated near 0τ = , it all boils down to a simple-looking condition: 
 ( ) ( )2
(1)0
(2) 0
1 k
dU dkR v c w w
d dτ
τ
β
τ τ=
=
 ′= − − 
 

  (1.22) 
In a dynamically efficient economy, factor (1) is negative, while factor (2) is indeterminate. 
The sign of factor (2) is partly determined by Proposition 1.1. Accordingly, whether a PAYG 
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system is desirable or not, does not solely depend on dynamic efficiency or inefficiency, it also 
depends on how k  responds, i.e., on /dk dτ . Indeed, the possibility arises that there may be long-
run welfare gain from introducing a PAYG pension. After all, in a dynamically efficient economy, 
the capital-labor ratio level is lower compared to its Golden Rule level. As stated earlier, if the 
pension system can increase capital-labor ratio, and the increased dynamic efficiency exceeds the 
static inefficiency it brings about, the total effect on long-run welfare will be positive. 
Based on Proposition 1.1, and equation (1.22), we deduce the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.2 For a dynamically efficient ( )1R >  economy with endogenous retirement and 
CES utility, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2
(1)0
(2) 0
0 if 1 and 2 0
1
0 otherwisek
dU dkR v c w w
d dτ
τ
γ
β
τ τ=
=
> < > ′= − −   ≤  

  (1.23) 
That is: 
If 1γ ≥ , there is no long-run welfare case for introducing a PAYG pension; 
If 1γ < , introducing a PAYG pension may be beneficial in terms of long-run welfare. It depends 
on the sign of factor (2). 
This proposition contains several results. Firstly, there is no long-run welfare gain from 
introducing a PAYG pension if 1γ ≥ . This is in contrast with the standard model without 
endogenous retirement where this would hold for any γ . Secondly, in a standard set up, if the 
pension is neutral in k , it is neutral in welfare; that is not the case here. Thirdly, it seems to be 
possible that welfare could even go up upon introduction of a PAYG system for 1γ < . In this case, 
the capital-labor ratio has to have increased. Andersen and Bhattacharya (2013) show in a model 
with endogenous young-age labor supply that there is no case for introducing a PAYG pension if 
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1γ ≤  in a dynamically efficient economy (this is a special case of their lemma 8). However, if we 
allow endogenous labor supply in the second period instead of in the first period, the conclusion 
changes. The reason is that in their setup, if 1γ ≤ , introducing a social security system will cause 
the capital-labor ratio to decrease. Thus, the role of the capital-labor ratio is very essential when 
measuring the welfare. 
We close this section with a numerical example. Suppose 
( )11 11 1 11 21 1 1 1U c c l
γγ γ
γ γ γβ µ
−− −
− − −
 = + + −  , 
( )( )
1
1 , 1F A K L ρρ ρα α ρ
−− −= + − ≥ − . 
With 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5, 3γ β µ α ρ= = = = =  and 5.6A = , Figure 1.1 plots the effects of introducing 
a PAYG pension on the economy. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, in an initially dynamically efficient 
economy, introducing a PAYG pension will increase the capital-labor ratio and increase the long-
run welfare when τ  is in the range of ( )0,8% .4 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
A classic result in dynamic public economics states that a PAYG system will reduce capital 
intensity, and if the economy is dynamically efficient, the system will reduce welfare as well. This 
result can be shown in a standard Diamond OG model with exogenous labor supply. In this paper, 
we study these established results in a setting where the endogenous retirement is included. The 
relation between the pension system, and capital intensity and welfare, becomes significantly more 
complex. The reason is that a second channel emerges. It relates the pension system and labor 
                                                 
4 When 8%τ = , we have 3.4R = . By considering the length of each period to be 35 years, it implies an annual 
interest rate of 3.6%. 
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supply, and thus the capital-labor ratio, along with the relation between savings, factor prices and 
capital accumulation. Within a general environment, we find that the effect of a PAYG pension 
system on the steady-state capital-labor ratio is not clear-cut. It depends on the magnitude and 
directions of the saving and labor supply responses to a change in the pension system. 
To make the analysis and the results more tractable (and easier to follow), the model is 
specified with a CES utility function. In this specified environment, it is found that the effect of 
the PAYG system on the capital-labor ratio will only depend on the elasticity of substitution 
between consumptions and leisure relative to one. Specifically, in the logarithmic utility case, 
introducing a PAYG system is neutral in terms of capital-labor ratio. 
We also look at the welfare effects of introducing a PAYG pension system. Unlike in the 
standard Diamond model where it only depends on whether the initial steady-state is dynamically 
 
Figure 1.1. The effects of introducing a PAYG pension 
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efficient or inefficient, here it also depends on how the capital-labor ratio reacts. For an initially 
dynamically efficient economy, if the capital-labor ratio increases with the introduction of PAYG 
pensions, it may be welfare-enhancing, depending on whether the increased dynamic efficiency 
exceeds the static inefficiency. In short, in a dynamically efficient economy with endogenous 
retirement, a PAYG system may be desirable. 
In conclusion, it is important that a caveat be recorded. The analysis in this paper has been 
entirely restricted to steady states. It is shown that the introduction of a PAYG system may be 
desirable from the perspective of the long run. Our justification for using steady-state welfare as 
the yardstick for judging desirability is simple: if a policy fails to generate long-run welfare gains, 
it is unlikely to be ever adopted. However, despite our demonstration of the steady-state welfare 
gains, it may be questioned whether such an arrangement can ever be implemented in the short 
run. After all, it is quite possible that some initial generations are hurt in the process of getting to 
that long-run outcome. There may be ways to leave the welfare of these generations unchanged 
even after the policy is introduced. Presumably there are mechanisms -- similar in spirit to ones 
studied in Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2005) -- which allow some of the future welfare 
gains to be brought forward to compensate the initial generations. Such matters are worthy of 
future study. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aaron, Henry (1966) The social insurance paradox. Canadian Journal of Economics 32, 371-374. 
 
Abel, Andrew B., Gregory N. Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers and Richard J. Zeckhauser (1986) 
Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory and Evidence. Review of Economic Studies 56, 1-
20. 
 
Andersen, Torben M. and Joydeep Bhattacharya (2011) On myopia as rationale for social security. 
Economic Theory 47, 135-158. 
 
24 
 
Andersen, Torben M. and Joydeep Bhattacharya (2013) Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor 
supply. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17, 2013, 971-997. 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley and James Heckman (1974) The Estimation of Income and Substitution Effects 
in a Model of Family Labor Supply. Econometrica, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1974, 73-85. 
 
Azariadis, Costas (2000) Intertemporal Macroeconomics. Blackwell Oxford. Cambridge USA. 
 
Bagchi, Shantanu (2015) Labor supply and the optimality of Social Security. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 58, 167-185. 
 
Barbie, Martin, Marcus Hagedorn and Ashok Kaul (2004) Assessing aggregate tests of efficiency 
for dynamic economies. Topics in Macroeconomics 4, Article 16. 
 
Blanchard, Olivier and Stanley Fischer (1989) Lectures on Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Boskin, Michael J. (1978) Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest. Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 86, No. 2, Part 2: Research in Taxation (Apr., 1978), pp. S3-S27. 
 
Caliendo, Frank N. and Emin Gahramanov (2011) Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium, 
Journal of Economics and Finance 35, 470-502. 
 
Conesa, Juan C. and Dirk Krueger (1999) Social security reform with heterogeneous agents. 
Review of Economic Dynamics 2, 757-795. 
 
Cooley, Thomas F. and Jorge Soares (1999) A positive theory of social security based on 
reputation. Journal of Political Economy 107(1), 135-160. 
 
de la Croix, David and Philippe Michel (2002), A Theory of Economic Growth: Dynamics and 
Policy in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Diamond, Peter A. (1965) National debt in a neoclassical growth model. American Economic 
Review 55(5), 1126-1150. 
 
Fenge, Robert and Pierre Pestieau (2007), Social security and early retirement. The MIT Press. 
 
Fuster, Luisa, Ayse Imrohoroglu, and Selahattin Imrohoroglu (2007) Elimination of social security 
in a dynastic framework. Review of Economic Studies 74(1), 113-145. 
 
Feldstein, Martin and Jeffrey B. Liebman (2002) Social security. Handbook of Public Economics, 
in: A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, 
volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324 Elsevier. 
 
Galasso, Vincenzo and Paola Profeta (2004) Lessons for an aging aociety: The political 
sustainability of social security systems. Economic Policy 19, 63-115. 
25 
 
 
Gruber, Jonathan and David A. Wise (1999) Social security and retirement around the world. 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hu, Sheng-Cheng (1979) Social security, the supply of labor, and capital accumulation. American 
Economic Review, 69, 274-284. 
 
Krueger, Dirk (2006) Public insurance against idiosyncratic and aggregate risk: The case of social 
security and progressive taxation. CESifo Economic Studies 52, 587-620. 
 
Michel, Philippe and Pierre Pestieau (2013) Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-
generations growth model. Annals of Economics and Finance 14, 705-719. 
 
Samuelson, Paul A. (1975) Optimum social security in a life-cycle growth model. International 
Economic Review 16(3), 539-544. 
 
Yaari, Menahem E. (1965) Uncertain lifetime, life insurance, and the theory of the consumer. 
Review of Economic Studies 32(2), 1965, 137-150. 
  
26 
 
APPENDIX 1.A 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.1 
 
Using the first order conditions (1.9) and (1.10), we get  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1
2
11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1
10
t t t t t t
tt t t t t t t
t t
t t
t t t t
u R v R w B v s
lR w B v w B v h
R l vu
w
v w B l v
β β τ
τ τ µ
β
τ
τ
+ + + + +
++ + + + + + +
+ +
+ + + +
 ′′ ′′ ′′⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅  ∂     ∂ ′′ ′′ ′′  − − ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅       
′′ ⋅ ′′ − ⋅ 
= − ∂ − −        ′ ′′⋅ + − − ⋅     
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1 1
t t
t t t t
t t
t t t t t t t t
w
v R s v R l v
R B
w B s v v w B l v
τ
β β β
τ τ
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + + + + + +
∂ −  
′ ′′ ′′⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅   
− ∂ − ∂      ′′ ′ ′′− − ⋅ − ⋅ + − − − ⋅         
 
Define the determinant of the coefficient matrix to be D . It is easy to show that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )2 21 1 1 11 0t t t tD u w B v h R v hτ µ βµ+ + + +′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ >    
Using Cramer's rule and (9) (10), we get 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
1 1 11 0,1
1
t t tt
t t
w B v hs u
Dw
τ µ
τ
+ + + ′′ ′′− − ⋅ + ⋅ ∂  ′′= ⋅ ∈
∂ −  
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1 1
0
1
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t t
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Dw
µβ
τ
+
+
+ +
′ ′′⋅ − ⋅∂ ′′= ⋅ <
∂ −  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1
1t t t t tt
t
w B h v v R s v hs
R D
τ
βµ + + + +
+
′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′′− − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅   ∂    = −
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( ) ( )
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11
1
1
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t
s R h v
B D
µβ
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+
+
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( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 1 0
1
t t t tt
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R w B u vl
Dw
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τ
+ + + ++
′′ ′′− − − ⋅ ⋅ ∂  = <
∂ −  
 
27 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11
1 1
1
1
t t t t tt
t t
v u R u v w B l u vl
Dw
τ
τ
+ + + + ++
+ +
′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′′⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ ∂  = −
∂ −  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11
1
1
0t t t tt
t
w B u s u vl
R D
τ+ + ++
+
′ ′′ ′′− − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅   ∂    = <
∂
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11
1
1 1
0t t t t tt
t
v u R u v w B l u vl
B D
τ+ + + + ++
+
′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′′⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − − − − ⋅ ⋅ ∂  = <
∂
 
 
APPENDIX 1.B 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.2 
 
The proof of Lemma 1.2 is very similar to that of Lemma l.1. Using the first order 
conditions (1.13) and (1.14), we get 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
1
1
1
1
2
1 1 1
2
112
11 1 1 22
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11
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1
0 1
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τ
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β β
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+
+
+ + +
−
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Define the determinant of the coefficient matrix to be 2D . It is easy to show that 
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5 This holds under assumption 1. 
 
6 This holds under assumption 2. 
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APPENDIX 1.D 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1 
 
Using the expressions for sτ

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With CES Utility functions, one of the first order conditions in the steady state is 
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Also, note that in the steady state, the resource constraint implies that 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 PARETO-IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES  
UNDER DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
For centuries, most of mankind struggled with fundamental, existential issues such as food, 
shelter, survival; concerns about global warming and climate change hardly ever occupied 
anyone's attention. There was really no need for such environmental concerns anyway. 
Climatologists tell us that, before 1750, atmospheric concentrations of 2CO , 4CH , and 2N O  -- 
three important long-lived greenhouse gases -- were quite low.7 The Industrial Revolution changed 
all that. Economic growth, stuck for a millennium at around 0.5% per year, doubled to 1% or 
higher in Western Europe and later in the Americas. Along with increased prosperity came 
deforestation (to make way for agriculture) and the burning of fossil fuels (to supply the energy 
needs of growing economies). Atmospheric concentration of 2CO  started increasing; current 
levels are 35% higher than what they were in 1850. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates, if 
nothing is done, 2CO  concentrations could reach 900 ppm by the year 2100. The IPCC reports 
that such increases in concentrations of greenhouse gases could cause global temperatures to rise 
substantially, even 4-6 C  or higher. Not a day goes by when climate scientists, economists, even 
politicians don't raise alarm over the expected dire consequences of such temperature rises: the list 
                                                 
7 Before 1750, concentrations of 2CO  and 4CH  were below 280 ppm and 790 ppb, respectively. These days, 
concentrations of 2CO  are about 390 ppm and 4CH  levels exceed 1,770 ppb. Climatologists document that these 
numbers are much higher than at any time during the last 650,000 years. Climate models suggest that only 5% of the 
total extra 2CO  in the atmosphere – the 2CO  that wouldn't be there if humans didn't create it -- date back to pre-
1850. 
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is long and includes substantial sea-level rises, sharp decline in agricultural output, coastal erosion, 
demise of fish stocks, rise in the frequency of severe weather events, and massive ecosystem 
upheavals. Today climate change and global warming are viewed by many as top-level existential 
threats, much in the same way food, shelter, and survival concerns occupied the minds of our 
distant ancestors. 
Unlike these other existential concerns, climate change is an externality -- the Stern Review 
(2007) calls it the greatest market failure and largest externality in history. What is more, both the 
externality and the measures needed to address it are, necessarily, intergenerational in nature. After 
all, greenhouse gases are long-lived and their effects linger, long after they appear. Similarly, 
costly measures adopted today may generate benefits far into the future, well beyond the lifespan 
of the generations funding them. As such, any response towards combating climate change will 
require strong political action across generations. By the same token, however, any policy response 
will likely create intergenerational winners and losers and, in turn, raise thorny questions about 
intergenerational equity and its trade-off with efficiency. Pearson (2011) phrases it bluntly: Should 
we sacrifice our use of cheap fossil fuel energy today so that generations yet unborn, who 
presumably will be richer than we are, can avoid adjusting to a warmer world? Do we owe the 
future a clean planet? Even if we could agree that the answer to the previous question is yes, how 
should the near-term costs of clean-up be allocated across generations in a fair and efficient 
manner? For if it is not perceived to be fair, why would different generations participate in this 
cross-generational initiative? There are other concerns of a more practical nature. Specifically, 
there is no political institution or mechanism through which the present generation can securely 
compensate [...future] generations for the consequences of global warming [...and symmetrically,] 
there is no obvious way for future generations [...] to compensate us for our sacrifices if we take 
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expensive greenhouse abatement measures today. (Pearson, 2011; pp. 23) Is it possible to navigate 
our way around these concerns? 
The by-now vast literature on Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) has taken up aspects 
of these overarching themes by uniting the science and economics of climate change via the 
damage function, a way of identifying the impacts of climate change and attributing monetary 
damages to them. Their goal, in many instances, is to maximize a global welfare criterion within 
the confines of an infinitely-lived-agent, Ramsey-style model and the control variable is an 
abatement policy. The point is to solve for optimal paths for consumption, investment, and other 
variables while devoting enough resources to keeping the environment clean. Intergenerational 
conflict of the type discussed above is a mere sideshow in the one-agent, one-world scenario that 
IAMs study. 
In this paper, we are conceptually motivated by the same sort of big questions that occupy 
the IAMs but our goal is far more modest: it is to write down a simple, analytically tractable (and 
therefore, stylized) model that captures the essence of the intergenerational conflict discussed 
above.8 Specifically, we study a small open, overlapping-generations economy in which laissez 
faire -- business as usual (BAU) -- is associated with declining consumption, declining welfare 
and worsening of the environment over generations. A government contemplates policy action 
aimed at correcting the underlying intergenerational externality by cleaning up the environment. 
Allowing for the fact that heat-trapping gases such as carbon dioxide stay on for generations, 
benefits from the government's clean-up effort would take time to ramp up. Understandably, such 
a policy would create winners and losers, across cohorts. The standard response to these inter-
                                                 
8 Our goal is not to produce a reasonably accurate model of climate-change economics nor is it to study specific 
policies suggested as ways to combat climate change. 
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generational equity concerns would be to postulate a social welfare function, a weighted function 
of the welfare of current and future generations, the likely losers and winners respectively. 
Depending on the weights chosen -- a matter of considerable importance as discussed in the Stern 
Review (2007) -- policy action may be justified if it maximizes the generationally-aggregated 
social welfare function even if it requires some generations to sacrifice for others. We refocus the 
issue. Along with several recent papers -- Bovenberg and Heijdra (2002), Hoel et al. (2015), von 
Below et al. (2015), and others -- we sidestep the contentious issue of assigning weights to 
generations and directly ask, can policy action be rationalized even after imposing the Pareto 
criterion, the restriction that no generation subsequent to policy action be made worse off than if 
business as usual had continued? 
Why might we think such a line of questioning may yield answers? Standard welfare 
economics, recently emphasized by Foley (2008) and Heal (2009), suggests that in the presence of 
a huge uninternalized externality such as climate change, the business-as-usual scenario cannot be 
Pareto efficient and hence action to correct the externality must, in principle, offer a Pareto 
improvement: the gains must outweigh the costs so that the gainers could compensate the losers 
and still gain. We can all come out ahead --- whether we actually do is a matter of institutional 
design. (Heal, 2009) This remark from Heal (2009) captures the essence of our endeavor. To begin 
with, we employ insights from overlapping-generation models of deficit financing -- see 
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) -- to address Pearson's (2011) concern about there being no obvious 
way by which generations can share clean-up costs: we allow for inter-generational compensation 
for investments in environment-friendly policies via debt financing.9 By insisting that such policies 
                                                 
9 As Sachs (2015) puts it, “[t]his is an option too rarely discussed in the current debate”. 
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meet the generational Pareto criterion, we are in effect arguing that Pearson's other concern -- lack 
of a political institution -- is not that critical: after all, it seems natural to think that policies that 
satisfy the Pareto criterion are less likely to be blocked as they make their way through modern 
democratic processes. What makes our analysis especially challenging is the fact that the very act 
of compensating current generations releases its own dynamics. For sure, investments in 
environment-friendly policies via debt financing allow future generations to reap gains, but they 
also have to participate, via tax payments and additional debt purchase, in the servicing of the 
outstanding debt. Debt will be growing at the gross rate of interest (assumed to exceed unity) which 
means it is by no means trivial whether the downstream gains from a better environment can cover 
the aforediscussed compensation (including interest) and prevent the debt from exploding. There 
is the added complication that the tax instrument we study is distortionary: it affects incentives to 
produce, with feedback effects on both the budget and the environment and other variables 
influencing welfare. In sum, one major contribution of this paper lies in the demonstration of the 
possibility that Pareto improvements over BAU are possible and that the associated path of debt 
does not misbehave. 
There is another important dimension in which we advance the literature. As Karp and 
Rezai (2014a) argues, a convergent conclusion from the literature emanating from the Stern 
Review (2007) and the IAMs -- summarized in Heal (2009) -- is that current generations must 
sacrifice consumption in order to combat climate change.10 This conclusion is often blamed as the 
                                                 
10 Kolbert (2008) profiles the goals and aspirations of a Swiss organization, the 2,000-Watt Society, which pushes 
for human beings to lead a life using less than two-thousand-watts of energy in a day. Evidently, the average Swiss 
uses about 5,000 watts and bringing this down to 2,000 would require a significant reduction in every realm: as 
Kolbert (2008) puts it, a person who continued to travel and use electricity at current rates would consume two 
thousand watts without having anywhere to live or work, or anything to eat. Nordhaus (2007) argues that 
assumptions in the Stern Review (2007) concerning a low discount factor amplifies the harmful impacts of climate 
change in the distant future and rationalizes deep cuts in emissions, and indeed in all consumption, today. Rezai 
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reason why climate negotiations between countries have proven to be a non-starter.11 We take on 
the challenge of studying policies that not only satisfy the generational Pareto criterion in utility 
terms, but also ensure that no generation has to sacrifice consumption along the way.12 Our results 
connect up with the broader literature on sustainability -- Neumayer (2007), Heal (2009) -- that 
recognizes substitutability between a loss to environmental capital (due to global warming) and 
gains to incomes/ consumption and argues for the need to maintain at least a minimum critical 
level of the former. In a way, requiring that consumption not decline ties our hands substantially; 
it precludes the possibility of exploiting the substitutability of the environment and consumption 
to leave generations as happy as in the BAU. 
The literature on the economics of inter-generational equity and efficiency concerns in 
environmental models is vast. Below, we summarize some of the papers that are closest in spirit 
to the current endeavor. An early contribution that led the way in terms of the search for Pareto-
improving policies is Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) study a productive, non-renewable natural 
resource with amenity value and show that handing over property rights over that resource to an 
intergenerational trust fund that entitles every generation to the same income claim as in the zero 
extraction policy can yield a Pareto improvement.13 Of course, for the initial generation to want to 
                                                 
(2010) argues this need to cut consumption is an artifact of the constraining assumption made in IAMs that, in spite 
of knowing about the dangers of climate change, agents in the BAU, invest nothing in mitigation, a constrained-
optimal equilibrium. This automatically implies current generations would attain lower consumption and utility 
levels if they started investing in mitigation. 
 
11 The American way of life is not up for negotiation -- the classic U.S. position outlined by the senior President 
George Bush at 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. 
 
12 That something like this may be possible has been discussed, informally, in Foley (2008). 
 
13 Rasmussen (2003) is an early example of a paper using a calibrated OG model to study environmental taxation in 
a model where environmental quality is held fixed. Leach (2009) is similar in spirit but stays away studying tax or 
debt policies. 
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create the fund requires them to care about future generations. An important contribution involving 
intergenerational borrowing is Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998). In their setup, distant and near 
generations differ in their reliance on capital income (which translates to non-environmental 
welfare) versus environmental utility. Taxes on pollution are akin to a tax on capital and benefit 
distant generations -- they enjoy a better environment -- but hurt them because they inherit a 
smaller stock of physical capital. Debt, as in our paper, can be used to allow all generations to 
share in the efficiency gains of environmental policy, in some cases in a Pareto-improving way.14 
The assumption that pollution hurts utility directly but does not affect production makes our results 
non-comparable; additionally, only marginal policy changes relative to the BAU are considered 
which means they can sidestep issues relating to long-run behavior of debt paths. 
Karp and Rezai (2014a, b) focus on the conflict between different types of agents alive 
when the [mitigation] policy is first implemented. They depart from the usual one-sector OG model 
and allow for two sectors with an endogenously-evolving relative price between the sectors. They 
rely on an idea, reminiscent of Poutvaara (2003), that if investments in pollution mitigation by the 
current young generate increases in future asset values, then the current old -- the owners of said 
assets -- can compensate the young from those capitalized benefits leaving everyone better off, 
just as Heal (2009) argued would be possible. Conceptually, the novelty of their paper rests on the 
fact that tax-induced increases in asset prices allow market-intermediated, Pareto-improving 
                                                 
14 Our work is part of an important literature that studies the consequences of environmental policies on 
environmental quality, growth and welfare (Howarth and Norgaard 1992; John and Pecchenino 1994; Jouvet et al. 
2000; Gutierrez 2008; Goenka et al. 2012; Dao and Davila, 2014; Wang et al, 2015). In many of these papers, 
environmental quality enters preferences directly. Their primary purpose is to study the role of government for 
eliminating the dynamic inefficiency in OG economies with environmental externalities. These papers focus on tax-
financed mitigation policies and do not allow for debt financing. Intergenerational equity concerns or the search for 
Pareto-improving policies is not their focus. Fodha and Seegmuller (2014) do allow for debt financing but stay away 
from studying welfare issues along the transition. 
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policies even when the government cannot use bonds to redistribute across generations. Dao et al. 
(2015) study an intergenerational social compact between generations in which the young invest 
some of their labor income in mitigation activities in return for a subsidy to their old-age capital 
income paid for by the next young generation. The compact terms are such that participation in it 
generates a Pareto improvement compared to non-participation. They also consider compact terms 
that are self-sustaining, meaning any incentive to default on the contractual terms are eliminated. 
In an important recent contribution, von Below et. al (2015) revisit the Poutvaara (2003) and Karp 
and Rezai (2014a, b) strategy of resolving the conflict between the young and the old at the point 
the mitigation policy is implemented. In their setup, the old and young suffer losses in rental and 
wage income when energy use (which is polluting) is curtailed but the old can be offered a 
compensatory pension by the young in lieu of the future benefit the latter get from a better 
environment. The added novelty comes from the fact that the benefit from a cleaner environment 
accrues not just to the current young in the future, but to all future generations; if the future 
beneficiaries can be co-opted into the deal between the current young and old, then far more 
ambitious environmental policies can be attempted without hurting any generation. Their focus, 
however, is not on the behavior of the path of pensions nor are they seeking policies that always 
improve upon consumption in the BAU. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model economy and 
the business as usual environment, and exposes the inefficiency. Section 2.3 studies an 
environmental policy under a generational Pareto criterion. Section 2.4 presents a tractable case 
with quasi-linear utility and Section 2.5 studies the robustness of the results. Finally, Section 2.6 
concludes. Proofs of results are contained in the appendices. 
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2.2 The Model Economy: BAU 
 
2.2.1 Preliminaries 
We consider a one-good, small, open economy inhabited by two period-lived generations 
of agents and an infinitely-lived policymaker. At each date 0,1, 2,...t j+ =  a unit mass of identical 
agents is born. The laissez faire economy is called “business as usual” (BAU). Agents are called 
“young” (“old”) in the first (second) period of life. Young agents are endowed with one unit of 
labor and nothing when old. The young also have access to a production technology ( )F  that uses 
labor ( )L  as the only input to produce the single, consumption good. We assume ( )F L  has 
standard properties, ( ) ( )0, 0L LLF L F L> ≤  with the implication that ( )F L LL F≥ . All agents have 
complete access to perfect international capital markets and can save at a fixed, gross return R . 
Pollution is generated as a by-product of productive activities. Let total pollutant emissions 
from productive activities in period t j+  be denoted by t je +  and let the stock of pollutants at the 
start of t j+  be denoted by t jS + . Then, the stock of pollution at the start of 1t j+ +  is described 
by  
 ( )1 01 , 0 givent j t j t jS S e Sε+ + + += − + >   (2.1) 
Where ( )0,1ε ∈  is a constant that determines the speed with which pollution levels return to zero 
in the absence of any fresh emissions. Notice how eq. (1) captures the idea that changes to the 
environment can be very long-lived, spread across many cohorts. Since labor is the only input, we 
think of it as the polluting input as well: we posit that use of input t jL +  generates emissions of 
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amount ( )t j t je G L+ +=  where ( )0 0G =  and ( ) 0LG ⋅ > .15 Emissions can increase more (less) 
rapidly than input use if G  is assumed to be convex (concave) -- see Heutel (2012). Pollution is 
an unintended by-product of productive activity by firms and no firm-level disposal of this by-
product is possible. (Murty et al., 2012) 
As is standard, pollution reduces the production of output as captured by a damage 
function, ( )H S , where ( ) ( )0 1, 0SH H S= <  for 0S > . Some of the analytics in the study of debt 
dynamics below will be conducted with a linear approximation 
 ( ) 1 ; 0 and 0H S Sρ ρ ρ= − > ≈   (2.2) 
which satisfies ( )0 1H =  and ( ) 0SH S ρ= − < . Net output (denoted by y  in period t j+  is given 
by  
( ) ( )( , ) ,t j t j t j t jy S L H S F L+ + + +=  
where it is seen that 0, 0S Ly y< >  and 0SLy < . Pollution reduces net output (since ( ) 0)SH S <
that is available for consumption.16 Also, while the marginal product of labor is positive, it declines 
with pollution: ( )H S  acts as an adverse productivity shock. Young agents produce at t j+  taking 
t jS +  as given and ( )t jH S +  captures the damage to their output caused by this level of pollution. 
The point is, t jS +  was created by the productive actions of their ancestors who did not internalize 
                                                 
15 Our results are unaffected if  G  depends on gross output. We allow for G  to depend on net output in the 
numerical section. 
 
16 The Stern Review (2007) uses 5% of GDP as the lower bound for the cost of climate change under the BAU 
scenario. Burke et al. (2015) show that overall economic productivity is nonlinear in temperature for all countries, 
rich or poor, with productivity falling sharply at temperatures higher than 13 oC , and that the relationship is true for 
both agricultural and non-agricultural activity. Dell et al. (2012) finds strong growth effects but only for poor 
countries. 
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the downstream damage; after all, agents are not altruistic and changes in the environment have 
no direct effect on them. 
We assume agents born in period t j+  care only about young-age leisure ( )1t j t jl L+ +≡ − , 
and old-age consumption ( )1t jc + + . The utility function for generation t j+  is given by 
( ) ( )1t j t j t jU u c v l+ + + +≡ +  where ( )u ⋅  and ( )v ⋅  satisfies standard properties, 0c ccu u> ≥  and 
0l llv v> ≥ . In much of what we do below, we assume an iso-elastic form for u : 
 ( ) ( )
1
1
1 ; 0.1
t j
t j
c
u c
σ
σ
σ
−
+ +
+ + = ≥−
  (2.3) 
It is apparent that the relevant Arrow-Pratt measure is cc
c
cU
U σ
− = . For future use, the special case of 
0σ =  will be referred to as quasi-linear utility. Also notice S  (or more generally, environmental 
quality) does not enter agents' utility directly. Importantly, there is no altruism on the part of 
agents.17 
 
2.2.2 Discussion of modeling assumptions 
The model setup is necessarily barebones, designed to generate clean qualitative insights 
taking advantage of a lot of analytical tractability. Unlike John and Pecennino (1994), we do not 
embed environmental quality in the utility function, which allows us to sidestep issues relating to 
the substitutability between environmental and consumption goods, for as Neumeyer (2007) and 
others have argued, if the substitutability is low, then it may be that no consumption growth, 
                                                 
17 We disallow altruism on the part of agents not because we think people don't care about the welfare of their 
progeny but because we wish to make a case for environmental action even if they didn't. Allowing altruism would 
also introduce private transfers from parents to children some of which may be crowded out by the government's 
debt policy. 
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however high, can compensate for the damage to the environment -- after all, as Heal (2009) points 
out, certain ecosystem services or products, such as water and food, are essential to survival and 
cannot be replaced by produced goods. 
The assumption of a single input, labor, is obviously limiting but also keeps the analysis 
manageable. Studying a closed economy along with capital as an additional input, possibly the 
dirty input, would add another state variable, bring in interest rate effects, and clutter the dynamics 
considerably. As will become clear, our focus is largely on the issue of implementation of 
environmental policies under a generational Pareto criterion. Adding capital does not 
fundamentally alter our understanding of that issue. 
Unlike Integrated Assessment Models or models studying climate change more generally, 
we make no attempt to connect pollution with climate change and global temperature rises (with 
associated output losses for agriculture, sea-level rises, ecosystem disruptions, damage to fish 
stocks, etc.) Nor do we think in terms of a single world economy. Concrete examples of what we 
have in mind include water pollution that is limited to a country, localized atmospheric pollution 
over a region, and so on. 
 
2.2.3 Agent's problem 
Agents are atomistic producers who use their production technology to produce output of 
amount ( ) ( )t j t jH S F L+ + . The primary decision of the agent is his choice of labor input. For future 
use, we introduce a tax t jτ +  on labor. (The tax and its use is discussed in Section 2.3 below. For 
now, simply treat τ  as a parameter.) Since agents do not consume when young, they save their 
entire after-tax, young-age income, ( ) ( )t j t j t j t jH S F L Lτ+ + + + −  , at the world interest rate, 1R ≥ . 
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They take , t jR S +  and t jτ +  as given, and choose t jL +  to maximize their utility subject to the budget 
constraint ( ) ( )1t j t j t j t j t jc R H S F L Lτ+ + + + + + = −  . The first order condition (assuming an interior 
solution18) is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0.L c t j L t j t j l t jU u R H S F L v Lτ+ + + + = ⋅ − − − =    (2.4) 
It is easy to check that 0LLU < , implying the second order condition is satisfied. Eq. (2.4) 
implicitly defines an optimal labor supply function, ( ),t j t j t jL L S τ+ + += . In the BAU, the 
corresponding labor supply function is given by ( )BAU BAUt j t jL L S+ += . 
In this general form, lifetime indirect utility U  equals 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
,
, , 1 ,
t j
t j t j t j
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j
c
U S
u R H S F L S L S v L S
τ
τ τ τ τ
+ +
+ + +
+ + + + + + + + + + +
 
  = − + −  
 


  (2.5) 
and under BAU, it is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
1 .
BAU
t j
BAU BAU BAU BAU BAU
t j t j t j t j t j
c
U S u R H S F L S v L S
+ +
+ + + + +
 
  ≡ + −  
 


  (2.6) 
We start by asking, how do agents' labor supply respond if the stock of pollution is higher? 
Lemma 2.1 The sign of the comparative static labor supply responses, t j
t j
L
S
+
+
∂
∂  and 
t j
t j
L
τ
+
+
∂
∂  are, in 
general, ambiguous. In the BAU, we have 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1sign sign 1 sign 1  for (2.3).
BAU BAU
t j t j cc
BAU
t j c
dL S c u
dS u
σ+ + +
+
 − ⋅
= − = −  ⋅ 
  (2.7) 
                                                 
18 If we assume ( )0limc cu c→ = +∞  and ( )0liml lv l→ = +∞ , then we must have ( )0,1t jL + ∈ . 
46 
 
The expressions for t j
t j
L
S
+
+
∂
∂  and 
t j
t j
L
τ
+
+
∂
∂  outside of the BAU as well as the proof of Lemma 2.1 
are in Appendix 2.A. In the BAU, an increase in the stock of pollution reduces the marginal product 
of labor (which acts as a tax on labor supply) causing agents to want to substitute into leisure. 
However, there is a countervailing effect: as the environment worsens, net output (income) 
decreases inducing a wealth effect and incentivizing agents to want to supply more labor. The net 
effect is ambiguous and, as in the textbook models of labor supply, the net effect depends on risk 
aversion parameters. What happens to consumption? 
Lemma 2.2 (a) 1 0t j
t j
c
S
+ +
+
∂
<
∂
, (b) 1 0t j
t j
c
τ
+ +
+
∂
<
∂
. 
As the environment worsens, net output (income) decreases, shrinking the consumption 
possibilities of the agent. What happens to the welfare of agents? 
Lemma 2.3 (a) ( ), 0t j t j t j
t j
U S
S
τ+ + +
+
∂
<
∂

, (b) 
( ),
0t j t j t j
t j
U S τ
τ
+ + +
+
∂
<
∂

. 
Agents' utility depends on their consumption and leisure. The effect of pollution on their 
labor supply (leisure) is washed out by the envelope theorem. What remains is the indirect effect 
of pollution on the output they produce -- via the damage function -- which goes in a negative 
direction. A worsening environment hurts the welfare of every generation. The effect of a higher 
tax on the labor input -- the income, substitution effects -- are washed out by the envelope theorem; 
what remains is the direct effect on after-tax income which reduces consumption. 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
2.2.4 Dynamics and steady state: BAU 
We close our discussion by asking, how does environmental quality evolve along the 
transition therein? Using eq. (2.1), it follows that the dynamics of pollution in the BAU is described 
by the first-order, (possibly) non-linear difference equation 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1BAU BAU BAUt j t j t jS S G L Sε+ + + += − +   (2.8) 
where, recall ( )0,1ε ∈  and ( ) 0LG ⋅ > . A non-trivial steady state in the BAU, denoted by BAUS ∗ , is 
a fixed point of  
 
( ) ( );BAUBAU BAU BAU
G L
S L L S
ε
∗
∗ ∗ ∗= ≡   (2.9) 
Existence and uniqueness issues are dealt with using standard techniques.19 Similarly, imposing 
parametric restrictions such that 
 ( )( ) ( )10 1 0 1 1
BAU BAU
BAUBAU
t jt j
L BAUBAU BAU
t j t jS S
dL SdS
G L S
dS dS
ε
∗ ∗
++ + ∗
+ +
< < ⇔ < − + <   (2.10) 
holds ensures local stability of BAUS
∗ . If, in addition, we assume 0 BAUS S
∗< , then it is apparent that 
the stock of pollution in the BAU is increasing and converging to BAUS
∗  in the long run. 
 
2.2.5 Inefficiency 
Intuitively, agents do not take into account the effect of their production decisions on the 
pollution that generates which, in turn, affects the production decisions of their offspring. To see 
                                                 
19 Define ( ) ( )( )J S G L S Sε≡ − . Then, it follows ( ) ( )( )0 0 0J G L= >  and ( )limS J S→∞ = −∞  if G  
has a finite upper bound. If 1σ ≤ , then 0SL ≤ , so ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S L SJ S G L S ε= ⋅ − < , in which case BAUS ∗  is 
unique. 
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this more formally, write out the agent's problem in steady state. An agent takes S  as given to 
solve 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
max 1
s.t. 
P
L U u c v L
c RH S F L
≡ + −
=
 
The first order condition is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0c L lu c RH S F L v L− − =  which, combined with ( )S G Lε =  
-- see (eq. 2.9) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0
P P
P P P
c L l
G L G L
u RH F L RH F L v L
ε ε
    
     − − ≡
        
 
where PL  is the solution to the individual's problem.20 Now consider the problem of a social 
planner who solves  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
max 1
s.t. ,
SP
L U u c v L
c RH S F L S G Lε
≡ + −
= =
 
incorporating the effect of labor supply on the environment. Denote the planner's solution by .SPL  
Then,  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). 1 0.
SP SP
LSP SP SP SP
c S L l
G L G L
u RH F L R H F L H F L v L
ε ε
  
  ⋅ + − − =
    
 
For SPL  to be well-defined, assume 2 2 0
SPd U
dL
<  holds. (Even though 2 2 0
Pd U
dL
<  obtains, it does not 
follow that 2 2 0
SPd U
dL
<  holds, precisely because of the externality.) Notice, the underscored term 
arises because the planner takes into account the effect of his choice of L  on S  which, in turn, 
affects ( )H S . 
                                                 
20 As discussed earlier, 
2
2 0
PU
L
∂
∂
<  holds and so PL  is well defined. 
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Proposition 2.1 In the steady state, the private agent oversupplies labor (which translates into a 
worse environment) relative to the social planner, i.e., P SP P SPL L S S> ⇔ > . 
 
2.2.6 A portrait of the BAU 
In the regime without any sort of governmental involvement, the BAU, polluting emissions 
are a by-product of production using the (dirty) input, labor. Starting from a low initial level of 
pollution, 0S , under the conditions spelt out in (2.10), the stock of pollution continues to rise and 
approaches a higher level, BAUS
∗ , in the long run. This implies a steady, unrelenting decline in the 
quality of the environment. Along such a path of environmental degradation, it follows from 
Lemma 2.2 that consumption declines as well. In some utility specifications, labor supply rises 
along this transition, which, together with the consumption decline, serves to hurt every generation 
(See Figure 2.1). 
Every generation pollutes and leaves a worse environment for its progeny than what it 
received from its parents. The worsening environmental quality hurts the children but parents -- 
the people whose actions generated the pollution -- do not care (since they are not altruistic). The 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A portrait of the BAU, 1σ >  
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big question for us is, can the government initiate a pollution-reduction policy that leaves every 
generation, post policy, no worse off, possibly better off, compared to their life in the BAU? 
 
2.3 Environmental Policy 
The government wishes to implement a pollution-abatement policy designed to reduce 
pollution and improve environmental quality. We posit that the government commits to abating a 
fraction t jµ +  of the total emissions in period t j+ , at a cost ( ; )t j t jA eµ + +  where 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ; ) .t j t j t j t j t j t jA e e G Lµ µ µ+ + + + + += Λ = Λ   (2.11)  
We assume ( ) ( )0 0 0, 0, 0µ µ µµΛ = Λ = Λ > Λ >  for 0µ > : the abatement cost is 0 and minimum 
under BAU, and it is increasing and convex for positive levels of abatement. Under such a policy, 
the after-abatement total emissions in period t j+  is ( ) ( )1t j t j t je G Lµµ+ + += −  and the transition 
equation for the stock of pollution is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1t j t j t j t jS S G Lµ µ µε µ+ + + + += − + −   (2.12) 
where the superscript µ  reminds us that the variable in question is in the policy regime. 
 
2.3.1 Government finances and debt policy 
In our world, the government is entrusted with the task of reducing the level of pollution 
in the economy. The government's pollution abatement efforts may start at any date, taking as 
given the level of pollution under BAU, BAUtS . At any date, there are two modes of financing 
abatement expenses, either by taxation ( )t jτ +  or by public borrowing on the international capital 
market at rate R  (with associated debt and tax dynamics which we return to below). 
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A few definitions and notation descriptions are in order. Let t jB +  denote the stock of one-
period government debt at the end of period t j+ ; assume 1 0tB − =  (that is, there is no outstanding 
debt in the BAU). Also, let t jM +  denote the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance in t j+ , 
the difference between tax revenue and primary expenditure (abatement cost). Then, 
 ( ) ( )t j t j t j t j t jM L G Lµ µτ µ+ + + + += −Λ   (2.13) 
where t jL
µ
+  satisfies (2.4). Finally, define t jT +  as the total budget balance, that is the primary 
balance where interest payments to foreign lenders are added on to abatement expenses. Then,  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 .t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t jT L G L R B M R Bµ µτ µ+ + + + + + − + + − = − Λ + − = − −    (2.14) 
If 0t jT + > , we say there is a government budget surplus; a negative balance is called a government 
budget deficit. Debt service is defined as the sum of principal repayments, 1t jB + −  (because these 
are one-period bonds) and interest payments, ( ) 11 t jR B + −− . Fresh debt at t j+ , must cover debt 
service on previous debt and any primary budget shortfalls, i.e., 1t j t j t jB RB M+ + − += −  from where 
it follows that change in the stock of bonds satisfies 1t j t j t jB B T+ + − +− = − . 
Using the definitions above, write 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1t j t j t j t j t j t jB B R B B M M+ + + + + − + + +− = − − −   (2.15) 
Suppose 1 0t j t jM M+ + +− < , i.e., the primary budget balance deteriorates over time. Then, it is 
apparent that 1 0t j t jB B+ + +− >  meaning debt levels increase at each date. Since 1R > , debt levels 
along such a trajectory would explode rendering the policy fiscally unsustainable. Therefore, it 
becomes imperative the government can raise enough in tax revenue to prevent this from 
happening. A necessary condition for debt paths to be sustainable is that M  turns positive at some 
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date and 1 0t j t jM M+ + +− >  at some other date as well. For future use, define the debt turning point 
as the first date, say t k+ , for which 1t j t jB B+ + −<  holds, that is the first date for which the current 
debt level is below its immediate predecessor: 1t k t kB B+ + −< . It follows that 0t kT + > , there is a 
government budget surplus in t k+ . The relevance of the debt turning point is this. Suppose a debt 
turning point is reached at t k+  implying the first term on the r.h.s of eq. (2.15) is negative: 
( )1 0t k t kB B+ + −− < . If at that date, M  is positive, and 1 ,t j t jM M j k+ + +> ∀ > , the second term on the 
r.h.s of eq. (2.15) is also negative and together with the negative first term would imply 
1 ,t j t jB B j k+ + +< ∀ > . In other words, if M  is positive and rising over time (i.e., the gap between 
tax revenue and abatement expenses is positive and rising), then, debt levels once they fall -- the 
debt turning point is reached -- continue to fall forever after. Indeed, since it is assumed 1R > , the 
debt level will reach zero in finite time. At that point, the country is debt free; if it so wishes, it can 
continue to raise taxes to pay for pollution abatement and any primary surplus may be lent to world 
markets or rebated to taxpayers. 
 
2.3.2 Implementation hurdles and the Pareto criterion 
It seems possible that government intervention via pollution abatement may generate 
welfare gains downstream relative to life under the BAU. After all, lower pollution levels in the 
future will, ceteris paribus, boost output and consumption. But these welfare improvements may 
take a while to appear since pollution abatement is a slow process. Does this mean some initial 
generations will have to sacrifice for the benefit of the future ones? Could it be possible for society 
to reap the distant gains of government intervention all the while ensuring no generation is harmed 
along the way? 
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Answers to these questions are not trivial. The inaugural generation does not benefit from 
the pollution reduction -- at the point the policy is introduced, the pollution level and hence their 
labor supply is predetermined at BAU levels, and therefore the government must incur a debt to 
start things off. Higher taxes keep future debt levels low but push the burden on to current 
generations; likewise, lower taxes today raise the debt level, pushing the burden on to future 
generations, and raising the likelihood of placing debt on an exploding path. Future generations 
benefit from a better environment and those welfare gains can be taxed without hurting them. The 
question is, is this tax revenue sufficient to prevent the debt level from exploding? Does the answer 
to this question constrain how ambitious the abatement policy can be? An additional challenge lies 
ahead. Can welfare improvements be delivered by the policy without necessitating cuts in 
consumption along the way? 
Below, we study an environment-tax policy { }, , ; 0t j t j t jB jµ µ τ+ + += ≥  that is inaugurated 
in period ( )0t j =  of the BAU. (In places below, we consider the starting date of the policy to be 
the BAU steady state.) At the point the abatement policy is initiated, production is already 
complete and all emissions released. This implies the inaugural generation is unaffected by the 
policy -- their labor supply is predetermined from the BAU -- and hence they are not taxed. 
Consequently, the initial primary balance is ( ) ( ) 0BAUt tM G Lµ= −Λ <  and the initial debt needed 
to cover the abatement expense is positive. Thereafter, for 0j > , the primary deficit evolves as 
( ) ( )t j t j t j t jM L G Lµ µτ µ+ + + += −Λ  where ( ),t j t j t jL L Sµ µ τ+ + +=  and the stock of bonds as 
1t j t j t jB RB M+ + − += − . The law of motion for pollution is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 , .t j t j t j t jS S G L Sµ µ µε µ τ+ + + + += − + −  
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Our next order of business is to compute the path of taxes, t jτ + . Apropos our discussion 
above, we posit t jτ +  is chosen to satisfy the intergenerational Pareto criterion for 0j > : 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, , , , ,BAU BAU BAUt j t j t j t j t j t j t t j t j t jU c S L S U c S L Sµ µτ τ+ + + + + + + + + + +≥    (2.16) 
where the l.h.s of (2.16), indirect utility under the government's environment-tax policy, is given 
by 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
1
1
, ,
, , ,
t j
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j
t j t j t j t j t j t j
c
R H S F L S L S
U c L U L S
µ µ µ
µ µ
τ τ τ
τ
+ +
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
  −  =  
 
 

   (2.17) 
and the r.h.s of (2.16) is the counterfactual, what indirect utility would have been had the BAU 
world persisted. Also note, since the inaugural generation is not taxed and all abatement at 0j =  
is financed via debt, it is clear the inaugural generation enjoys the same utility as they would had 
the BAU continued. 
Here we define the implementability set for µ . An abatement policy, µ , is implementable 
under the Pareto criterion if the associated tax rates t jτ +  satisfy (2.16), and the associated path of 
debt, satisfying (2.13) - (2.15) is non-exploding. 
Moving forward, our goal is to characterize the path of taxes t jτ +  satisfying (2.16) and to 
specify the implementability set for µ . We also wish to provide an exact analysis of the dynamics 
of pollution under such a path of taxes and ascertain whether consumption is rising or falling along 
the transition. 
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2.4 Pareto-improving Environmental Policies under Quasi-linear Utility 
With these goals in mind, we present a very special but tractable case of quasi-linear utility: 
0σ =  (quasi-linear in consumption). More general specifications will be taken up in numerical 
examples below. Our starting point is the steady state under BAU meaning we assume the economy 
is already in the BAU steady state when the policy is first implemented. Our methodology allows 
for more generality, that is we can accommodate a setting in which the policy is inaugurated at 
any arbitrary point along the BAU transition. This last point is explored in numerical examples 
below. 
In practice, it is impossible to simply solve the non-linear equation (2.16) for t jτ +  and 
compute a path of Pareto-improving taxes that way. A convenient strategy is to compute a path of 
taxes, call it t jτ +

, such that one of the arguments of t jU
µ
+
 , labor supply, is the same in the policy 
regime as in the BAU. Specifically, t jτ +

 is that path of taxes that equates labor supply in the policy 
regime with that in the BAU -- i.e., t j BAUL L
µ ∗
+ =  where BAUL
∗  is defined in (2.9). In Appendix 2.E, 
we show that for quasi-linear utility, 0σ = , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).t j t j BAU L BAUH S H S F Lµτ ∗ ∗+ + = − 

  (2.18) 
Using ( ) ( ). .F LL F> , the same appendix also shows that 1t j BAUc c
µ ∗
+ + >  implying for the path of taxes,     
all agents (from generation 1t +  on) are strictly better off under the policy than they would have 
under the BAU. 
Lemma 2.4 In the special case of quasi-linear utility, an environmental-fiscal policy package,  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , ; 0t jt j t j t j BAU L BAU t jH S H S F L B jµµ µ τ τ ∗ ∗++ + + + = = = − ≥ 

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makes the utility of all generations (from generation 1t +  on) strictly higher than what they would 
have been had the BAU persisted. Under this package, the labor supply is the same pre and post 
policy while consumption is strictly higher. 
The following corollary argues that the result in the previous lemma can actually be 
extended to include all 1σ < , not just 0σ = . 
Corollary 2.1 More generally, if 1σ < , there exists a tax rate t jτ +

 such that the environmental-
fiscal policy package, 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ; 0BAUt jt j t j t j BAU t j
BAU
F L
H S H S B j
L
µµ µ τ τ
∗
∗
++ + + +∗
   = = < − ≥  
  

 
gives all generations (from generation 1t +  on) strictly higher utility than what they would have 
gotten had the BAU persisted. Under this package, the labor supply is the same pre and post policy 
while consumption is strictly higher. 
In passing, note that the condition on σ  is a sufficient condition. That the implementability 
set for µ  is non-empty for 1σ >  is explored in numerical examples below. 
 
2.4.1 Dynamics of pollution and taxes 
Since, by construction, the labor supplies are the same pre and post policy, t j BAUL L
µ ∗
+ = , the 
evolution equation for pollution can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 .t j t j BAUS S G Lµ µε µ ∗+ + += − + −   (2.19) 
The dynamics of pollution (and everything else) becomes a lot more tractable since the emissions 
in the policy economy are given by ( )BAUG L∗  which is predetermined. After a bit of routine 
manipulation, it can be shown that 
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( ) ( )11 1 1
j
t j BAUS S
µ ε µ µ+ ∗+ +  = − + −  . 
Clearly, t jS
µ
+  is declining relative to BAUS
∗  over time, and as j →∞ , long-run pollution levels will 
approach ( )1 BAUSµ ∗− , lower than its BAU counterpart. Declining pollution implies more output 
and more consumption; as such, under the Pareto criterion, taxes must rise. This is evident from 
( ) ( ) ( )t j t j BAU L BAUH S H S F Lµτ ∗ ∗+ + = − 

 and H  is increasing since t jS
µ
+  declines with  j . These 
ideas are collected in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.2 In the special case of quasi-linear utility, an environmental-fiscal policy package, 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, ; 0BAU BAUt jt j t j t j t j L t jH S H S F L jµµ µ τ τ ++ + + + + = = = − ≥ 

 
is associated with a declining path of pollution relative to the BAU steady-state level. It is also 
associated with the same path of labor supply and a strictly increasing path of consumption 
relative to BAU levels. The path of taxes, t jt jτ τ ++ =

, is increasing, however. 
Next, we turn to the all-important question, if the path of taxes is defined by t jτ +

, what is 
the associated path for the public debt? Most importantly, does satisfying the Pareto criterion 
render the path explosive? In other words, is the implementability set for µ  non-empty? 
 
2.4.2 Path of debt 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, using t j BAUL L
µ ∗
+ = , the primary budget is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t jt j t j t j
t j BAU L BAU BAU BAU
M L G L
H S H S F L L G L
µ µ
µ
τ µ
µ
++ + +
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
+
= −Λ
 = − −Λ 

  (2.20) 
implying the primary budget evolves as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 0t j t j t j t j L BAU BAUM M H S H S F L Lµ µ ∗ ∗+ + + + + + − = − >    (2.21) 
Since S µ  has been established to be declining over time. Knowing 1 0t j t jM M+ + +− >  for all j , it 
follows from the evolution equation for debt ( ) ( )1 1 1t j t j t j t j t j t jB B R B B M M+ + + + + − + + +− = − − −  that 
if at some date k , 1 0t k t kB B+ + −− < , then 1 0t j t jB B+ + +− <  for all j k> . Debt levels, once they fall, 
continue to fall forever after. And because 1R > , the debt reaches 0 in finite time. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, there are three critical dates of interest. First: when does 
t jM +  turn positive? The aforediscussed process of debt decline cannot start until a date when t jM +  
turns positive, that is the government starts to run up a surplus of tax revenue over its abatement 
expenditures (after all, only then can it turn its attention to debt servicing). Second, when does 
1 0t j t jB B+ + +− <  first happen? And third, when does 0t jB + → ? We take these up in turn. For what 
we present below, we use the linear approximation for the damage function as in (2.2) for 
tractability's sake. 
 
2.4.2.1 The first date when primary budget balance turns positive 
Recall that the initial primary deficit, ( ) ( ) 0BAUt tM G Lµ= −Λ <  and hence the initial debt 
needed to cover the abatement expense is positive. Thereafter the primary deficit evolves in a 
manner described by (2.20). Also recall that a necessary condition for the path of debt to decline 
is that t jM +  turns positive. Using (2.20) and (2.2), it is possible to write 
( )
( )( ) ( )1 1 jL BAU BAUt j BAU F L LM S ρ µεµ εε µ
∗ ∗
∗
+
 Λ
 = − − −
 
 
 
Suppose the first date when t jM +  turns positive is 1j k= .     
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Lemma 2.5 Suppose 10,µ µ ∈    where ( )
( )1
1
1 0
L BAU BAUF L L
µε
µρ ∗ ∗
Λ
− ≡ . Then,  
( )
( )
( )1
ln 1
,
ln 1
L BAU BAUF L Lk
µε
µρ
ε
∗ ∗
Λ − 
 =
−
 
and hence the first date when t jM +  turns positive is 1t k+     where 1k    is the smallest integer 
not less than 1k . Also, that first date rises as µ  increases. 
 
2.4.2.2 The first date when the debt starts to decline: the debt turning point 
The change in the level of debt between t j+  and 1t j+ +  is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
t j t j t j
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j
B B B
RB M RB M R B B M M
+ + + + +
+ + + + − + + + − + + +
∆ ≡ −
= − − − = − − −
 
which upon repeated iteration yields 
( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 1
0 0
j j
j i j j t i t i
t j t i t i t t ti
i i
M MB R M M R B B R M
R
− + + + + +
+ + + + + − +
= =
 −
∆ = − − + − = − + 
 
∑ ∑  
Using (2.2), it is possible to write ( ) ( )1 1 it i t i BAU L BAU BAUM M S F L Lεµρ ε∗ ∗ ∗+ + +− = − , which leads to 
( ) ( )11
1
11
1
j
L BAU BAUj
t j BAU
F L L
B R S
R R
ρ µεεµ
ε µ
∗ ∗ +
+ ∗
+ +
   Λ−  ∆ = − − −   − +     
 
Recall, on the first date 0tB >  and also that once debt begins to fall, it falls forever. Noting that, 
there are three possibilities to consider: 1) the debt keeps increasing, 2) the debt first rises and then 
falls, and 3) the debt starts to decrease right away ( 1t tB B+ < ). In case (2) and (3), the debt will 
eventually reach zero. Suppose the first date when the debt declines is 2j k= .     
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Proposition 2.3 Suppose 2 10,µ µ µ ∈ <   where ( )
( )2
2
11 0
L BAU BAU
R
F L L
µε
µρ ∗ ∗
Λ− +− ≡ . Then, as per case (2),  
( )
( )
( )
1
2 1
ln 1
ln
L BAU BAU
R
F L L
R
k
µε
µρ
ε
∗ ∗
Λ− +
−
 − 
 =  
and so the first date when the debt starts to decline is 2t k+     where 2k    is the smallest integer 
not less than 2k . Also, that first date rises as µ  increases. 
Note, if 2µ µ> , case (1) obtains. For case (3) to obtain, we need 2 1k < , which requires 
( ) ( )L BAU BAUF L L
R
ρµ
µ
∗ ∗
Λ <  to hold. 
 
2.4.2.3 The first date when debt levels reach zero 
The debt in period t j+  (iterating 1t j t j t jB RB M+ + − += −  and using 1 0tB − = ) is given by 
0
.
j
j t i
t j i
i
MB R
R
+
+
=
= − ∑  
Using (2.2), it is possible to write 
( ) ( )
( )
( )11 1
11
11 11
1 1 1
jj
L BAU BAU R
t j BAU j
R
F L LR RB S
R R
ερ µ
εµ
ε ε µ
+∗ ∗+ −
∗
+ +
  − Λ− −  = − − −
  − − + −  
 
Recall ( ) 0t BAUB Sε µ∗= Λ >  and ( )
( ) ( )
1 11
L BAU BAUF L L
t BAU RB S R
ρ µ
µεµ
∗ ∗
Λ∗
+ +
 = − + − 
 
. If ( ) ( )1
L BAU BAUF L L
R
ρµ
µ
∗ ∗
Λ
+< , 
then 1 0tB + < , meaning the debt turns negative from the second period itself. It is a subset of the 
range of µ  which makes debt decline from the second period ( ( ) ( )L BAU BAU
F L L
R
ρµ
µ
∗ ∗
Λ < ). Based on the 
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analysis above, we know in case (2) and (3), the debt will reach zero in finite time. Suppose the 
date at which the debt hits zero is 3j k= . 
Proposition 2.4  3k  is the solution to 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )3
3
11
11
111
1 1
k
L BAU BAU R
k
R
F L L R
R
ερ µ
ε ε µ
+∗ ∗ −
+
 − Λ−
 − =
 − + − 
  (2.22) 
To ensure (2.22) has a solution 3 0k > , we require  
( ) ( )
1
L BAU BAUF L L
R
ρµ
µ ε
∗ ∗Λ
<
− +
, 
the same range of µ  that is required for the existence of the debt turning point in Proposition 2.3. 
The debt is zero at date 3t k+     and that date is pushed back if a higher µ  is to be implemented. 
The upshot is that the implementability set for µ  is non-empty, that there exists a range of
µ  that the government can usher in under a generational Pareto criterion that leaves every 
generation at least as well off, possibly better, than if the BAU world had continued. The policy 
economy has lower pollution and higher consumption as well. 
 
2.5 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we study the robustness of some of our results to some alternative 
formulations. First and foremost, we wish to demonstrate that the general tenor of our results go 
through when 1σ > . Second, we check if the policy can be inaugurated at any point in the BAU 
transition, not necessarily at the steady state. Third, we had, for tractability's sake assumed an 
affine damage function in the computation of the debt dynamics; here, we relax that restriction as 
well. And finally, we allow emissions to vary with output as in Karp and Rezai (2014b). 
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Our model is designed to offer qualitative insight, and pursuant to that end, is silent on the 
quantitative margin. The goal here is not a full-blown calibration exercise but rather to paint a 
picture of the Pareto-improving transition with broad brushstrokes to see if environmental policy 
can improve matters and the associated debt paths don't misbehave. We start by assigning 
parameter values that are in line with established practice in the literature. The following functional 
forms are used:  
Utility: ( )
1 1
1
1 , ;  0,  0,  0.1 1
t j t j
t j t j t j
c L
U c L
σ γ
β σ β γ
σ γ
− −
+ + +
+ + + + = − ≥ > <− −
 
Production: ( ) ;  0,  1.t j t jF L AL Aα α+ += > <  
Damage: ( ) 2
1 ;  0.
1t j t j
H S
S
ρ
ρ+ +
= >
+
 
Abatement cost: ( ) ;  0,  1.ϕµ λµ λ ϕΛ = > >  
Emission: ( )1 ;  0.t j t je yµ δ δ+ += − >  
The parameters of the model are chosen as follows: 1.7σ = , 0.5γ = − , 0.1β = , 100A = , 0.6,α =
74 10ρ −= × , 0.054λ = , 2.8φ = , 0.062δ = , 2R =  and 0.126ε = . The functional forms for 
damage ( )H ⋅ , abatement cost ( )Λ ⋅  and emissions e  and corresponding parameter values ( ,ρ ,λ
,ϕ δ  and ε ) are in line with those used in Karp and Rezai (2014b). By considering the length of 
each period as 35 years, the exogenous interest rate is calculated as 35(1 0.02) 2R = + = . A  is a 
scale parameter and α  is chosen to make labor's share of output (since we do not have capital in 
the model) equal to 0.6. A small β  is chosen so as to not make our results too reliant on a strong 
labor supply response. 
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We consider the following environmental policy: the government starts to abate 20% of 
the emissions generated in each period (hence, 0.2µ = ) starting from 0t = . We consider two 
cases: (i) the policy is inaugurated from the BAU steady state (Figure 2.2); (ii) the policy is 
inaugurated from a date well before the steady state is reached; specifically, it starts at a point 
where the pollution stock is lower than that at the BAU steady state. More specifically, we set 
0 0.85t BAUS S= = ×  (Figure 2.3). In each case, we choose a sequence { } 10t j jε + ≥>  and make 
( ) ( )BAUt j t j t jU U ε+ + +⋅ = ⋅ +  for all 0j > , that is, all generations from 1t +  are strictly better off.21  In 
both cases, the debt is paid off in about 12 periods and compared with the BAU, agents along the 
transition not only have higher utility, they also work less and consume more -- unlike much of 
the literature, we don't require them to sacrifice either consumption or leisure to make them 
happier. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
This paper studies a tractable small open economy populated by overlapping generations 
of agents facing a standard stock externality from pollution caused by productive activities. In the 
laissez faire equilibrium, environmental quality gets worse over time, and consumption and utility 
falls. The business-as-usual situation is a grim one and presents an opportunity for government 
intervention in the form of pollution abatement. The catch is that such policies are costly and it 
                                                 
21 As explained earlier, the way we've set things up, the generation born at the inaugural date cannot benefit from 
this environmental policy, unless the government borrows to makes transfers to them (which we disallow). The 
inaugural generations' utility is held at the BAU level; all others are made strictly better off. 
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Figure 2.2. Starting from the BAU steady state 
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Figure 2.3. Starting from a point along the BAU transition 
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takes a while for the benefits to start appearing in a substantial way. The government can borrow 
on international markets to start the abatement and can tax some of the downstream welfare gains 
to help pay down the debt. The big question is, can the government usher in such an environmental 
policy that makes sure that no generation is hurt (indeed all are better off) and the debt is paid off 
in finite time? We show, the answer is in the affirmative. The new equilibrium has lower pollution 
levels than in the business as usual world. Along the transition, every generation is better off (at 
least no worse off) in utility terms and consumption is also rising. 
Two additional points are worth noting. First, how does our discussion change if the 
assumption of a small open economy is abandoned in favor of a closed economy (with neoclassical 
production). With neoclassical production, factor prices are endogenous and the effects of policy 
choices at the initial date will, via its effects on endogenous variables such as saving (and hence 
capital stock, and factor returns), will linger forever. It is apparent that debt will crowd out private 
saving thereby reducing the capital stock. This causes the wage rate to decrease and the interest 
rate to increase. Whether these effects ease the implementation hurdles at that date, at future dates, 
is not at all clear. The dynamics of debt becomes immensely complicated since it gets coupled 
with the dynamics of the endogenously-evolving capital stock. It is our conjecture that the sorts of 
effects we discuss in the current paper will continue to operate in this more complicated setting. 
Our analysis has also stayed away from studying alternative policies that put a direct cap 
on labor supply (through mandatory length of work week laws). Also, instead of using debt, the 
generations could work out a corresponding path of intergenerational transfers as in von Below et 
al. (2015). It is our conjecture that any attempt to introduce such policies under the Pareto criterion 
would presumably face similar implementation hurdles as raised here. 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1 
 
From the first order condition (2.4), we can calculate 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 1 0,LL cc t j L t j t j c t j LL t j ll t j£ u R H S F L u RH S F L v Lτ+ + + + + + = ⋅ − + ⋅ + − <   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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 = ⋅ − + ⋅ 
 −− ⋅
= ⋅ − 
⋅ −  
 
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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It follows that 
, .t j t jLS L
t j LL t j LL
L L£ £
S £ £
τ
τ
+ +
+ +
∂ ∂
= − = −
∂ ∂
 
In the BAU, 0τ = , and then t j
t j
L
S
+
+
∂
∂  can be simplified to 
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.
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c
c u
c S t L t ut
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The rest follows. 
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APPENDIX 2.B 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.2 
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APPENDIX 2.C 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.3 
 
By the envelope theorem, we have 
( ) ( ) 0,t j c s
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APPENDIX 2.D 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). 1
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When evaluated at PL , we have using the first order condition to the agent's problem, 
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SPSP
L SP
c S
L
G LU u R H F L
L ε
 ∂
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implying .P SPL L>  
 
APPENDIX 2.E 
PATH OF TAXES UNDER POLICY-INVARIANT LABOR SUPPLY 
 
As discussed above, the inaugural generation ( )0t j =  is unaffected by the policy. Because 
of the government's abatement activity during period t , the start-of-period stock of pollution next 
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period ( 1j = ) satisfies 1 1
BAU
t tS S
µ
+ +< . If the government imposes no taxes, then it follows from 
Lemma 2.3 that generation 1t +  will be strictly better off. Some or all of this welfare gain may be 
taxed away by the government to help defray (part of) the abatement and debt service costs in that 
period. There exists a range for the tax rate, say 11 0, ttτ τ ++  ∈    such that 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1, BAU BAUt t t t tU S U Sµ τ+ + + + +≥  . When 11 ttτ τ ++ = , 1 1BAUt tU U+ +=   (a Pareto-neutral choice of tax) and 
if 1 0tτ + = , the government leaves all the welfare gains to generation 1.t +  
For now, we set aside our search for Pareto-improving taxes. Instead, we focus on a subset 
of taxes { }
1
t j
j
τ
∞
+
=

 such that ( ) ( ), , 0BAUt jt j t j t jL L S L S jµ µ τ ++ + += = ∀ ≥

. In other words, t jτ +

 is chosen 
to keep labor supply under the government's policy the same as its level in the BAU. This helps 
fix the second argument of  ( ).,.U in (2.16). We wish to investigate what implication this may 
have for the first argument, consumption, and via this channel, dig deeper into (2.16). The 
associated debt dynamics are a separate matter which we will turn to further below. 
Start with the optimality conditions for labor supply, pre and post policy, and use them to 
back out the necessary path of taxes using the fact ( )BAUt j t jL L Sµ+ += . This means 
BAU: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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  − − =
 
 
 
Policy: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 0 
t j
t j t jc t j t j t j t j L t j l t j
c
U R H S F L L R H S F L v L
µ
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 

 
with BAUt j t jL L
µ
+ += . 
For (2.3), these equations reduce to  
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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t j
BAU
t j
t j t jt j t j
BAU BAU BAU BAUF LBAUt j t j t j L t jt j L
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µ µ
τ τ
+
+
+ ++ +
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 
 − = − 
 
 
 
  (2.23) 
In general, ( ) ( )t
t
F L
L tL F L>  holds. First note, when 1σ = , there does not exist 0t jτ + >

 
satisfying (2.23) and therefore, labor supply pre and post policy cannot be the same. This is because 
with a logarithmic utility, a better environment has no direct effect on the labor supply. If the 
government nevertheless collects taxes anyway, labor supply would change, and utility cannot be 
brought back to BAU levels. 
If 1σ ≠ , then with 0,t jτ + >

 eq. (2.23) implies 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1.BAU
L t j
BAU
t j
t j t j
BAU F LBAUt j t j L
H S
H S H S
σ
µ
τ
+
+
−
+ +
+ +
 
 − < 
 
 

  (2.24) 
If 1σ < , then it follows from (2.24) that t jτ +

 must satisfy 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
BAU
t j
BAU
t j
F L BAU
t j t j t jL
H S H Sµτ +
+
+ + +
 < − 

 
in which case 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1BAU BAU BAU BAU BAUt jt j t j t j t j t j t j t jc R H S F L L RH S F L cµ µ τ ++ + + + + + + + + = − > = 

  (2.25) 
must hold. This means tax rates t jτ +

 that keep labor supply unchanged pre and post policy will 
benefit agents in consumption terms and offer higher utility relative to what they would get in the 
BAU. In general, we cannot solve t jτ +

 explicitly from (2.23). In a special case with quasi-linear 
utility function ( 0σ = ), we can solve ( ) ( ) ( ).BAU BAUt j t j t j L t jH S H S F Lµτ + + + + = − 

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APPENDIX 2.F 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.5 
 
If we use a linear approximation for damage function as in (2.2), then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
t j B t j L B B B
j
B L B B B
jL B B
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 = − − −Λ 
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 = − − −
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Because 0tM <  and t jM +  is increasing over time, to calculate the first date when it turns 
positive, we solve 
1
0t kM + =  and get 
( )
( )1 0.
L B BF L L
µε
µρ ∗ ∗
Λ− >  
First notice that only when ( )
( )1 0
L B BF L L
µε
µρ ∗ ∗
Λ− >  can we have a solution for 1k . This sets an 
upper bound for µ  (because ( )µµ
Λ  is increasing in µ ). Within this range 10,µ   , we can solve 
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( )1
ln 1
.
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L B BF L Lk
µε
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ε
∗ ∗
Λ − 
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−
 
We get the first date when M  turns positive ( 0Mk > ) by rounding up (taking the ceiling of 
1k ): 
0
1 .
Mk t k> = +     It can be easily shown 
0 0Mdkdµ
>
> .  
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APPENDIX 2.G 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3 
 
Use (2.2) in 
( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 1
0 0
j j
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We have shown that 0tB >  and once debt begins to fall, it will fall forever and reach zero 
in finite periods. To find the first date when debt declines, 0Bk < , we solve 
2
0t kB +∆ = : 
( )
( )21 11
k
L BAU BAU
R
R F L L
µε ε
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Λ− − +  = − 
 
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R
F L L
µε
µρ ∗ ∗
Λ− +− >  can we have a solution for 2k . This sets an upper bound for µ
, 2µ . Since 1R > , 2 1µ µ< . This is consistent with our understanding that a necessary condition 
for debt decline is to have a positive M  at an earlier date. Within the range 20,µ   , we can solve 
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1
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R
F L L
R
k
µε
µρ
ε
∗ ∗
Λ− +
−
 − 
 = . 
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  It can be easily shown 0 0Bdkdµ
<
>
 . 
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APPENDIX 2.H 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4 
 
The debt in period t j+  is (iterating 1t j t j t jB RB M+ + − += −  and using 1 0tB − = ) is given by 
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With a linear damage function,  
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To find the first date when debt reaches zero, 0Bk < , we solve 
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Define the numerator as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )111 1 1 11 11 ln 1 ln , 0
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so ( )Q x  is increasing in x  for 0x ≥ . 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 OIL PRICES, EXCHANGE RATES AND THE STOCK MARKET IN CHINA  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983), there is an expanding literature on the 
relationships between oil prices and economic activity. One stream of the literature focuses on the 
effects of oil prices on stock markets. In theory, an increase in oil price adversely impacts the 
profits of industries due to the increase in the production cost and thus has a negative effect on the 
stock market. But there is not a consistent conclusion in empirical findings. Park and Ratti (2008) 
estimate the effects of oil price shocks and oil price volatility on the real stock returns of the United 
States and 13 European countries using a multivariate VAR analysis. They find that oil price 
shocks have a statistically significant impact on real stock returns in the same month or within one 
month. Kilian and Park (2009) set up a model with four variables -- the percentage change in world 
crude oil production, global real economic activity, the real oil price, and return on US stocks -- 
and find that while oil demand shocks do depress stock prices, oil supply shocks have much less 
impact on stock prices. Apergis and Miller (2009) use a Structural VAR approach to analyze the 
effect of structural oil market shocks on the stock prices in eight developed economies. It is shown 
that oil market shocks do not have a very large or significant impact on the stock prices in these 
countries. 
The relationship between oil market and currency markets has also received great attention. 
The link was noted as early as in Golub (1983) and Krugman (1983): an oil-importing country 
may experience exchange rate depreciation when oil prices rise, and appreciation when oil prices 
fall. Likewise, the potential impact of exchange rates on oil price movements, highlighted by 
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Bloomberg and Harris (1995), is based on the law of one price for tradable goods: since oil is a 
homogeneous and internationally traded commodity, a change in the exchange rate would change 
the oil price to foreigners in foreign currencies, thereby changing their purchasing power and oil 
demand and, in turn, affecting the crude oil price. Amano and van Norden (1998) find a stable 
linkage exists between oil price shocks and the U.S. real effective exchange rate over the longer 
horizon. Their findings indicate that oil prices have been the dominant source of persistent shocks 
on real exchange rate. Chen and Chen (2007) investigate the long-run relationship between real 
oil prices and real exchange rates by using a monthly panel of G7 countries. They show that real 
oil prices may have been the dominant source of real exchange rate movements and that there is a 
cointegrating relationship between real oil prices and real exchange rates. Other studies confirming 
the significant impacts on real exchange rates in developed countries from oil price shocks include 
Chen and Rogoff (2003), Lizardo and Mollick (2010) and Zhou (1995). 
Literature also suggests that a relationship between the stock market and the currency 
market may exist. For example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) show that as many companies 
borrow in foreign currencies to fund their operations, fluctuations in exchange rate affect the value 
of the earnings as well as the cost of its funds, and hence its stock price. Oskooee and Sohrabian 
(1992) test for the relationship between the S&P price index and the effective exchange rate of the 
dollar, finding bidirectional causality relationship between the two markets in the short-run, but 
not long-run cointegrating relationship. Ratner (1993) finds that the U.S. dollar exchange rate and 
U.S. stock prices are not related in the long-run. Abdala and Murinde (1997) examine exchange 
rate and stock prices interactions in emerging financial markets and show that the long-run 
relationship found only in India and Philippines while in the short-run, they found unidirectional 
causality from the exchange rates to stock prices in most of their sample countries. Doong, Yang, 
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and Wang (2005) examine the dynamic relationship between stock prices and exchange rate in 
Asian countries, and find that stock prices and exchange rates are not cointegrated; they detect 
bidirectional causality in all sample countries except for Thailand. 
Most of these studies focus on developed countries and few studies have been conducted 
in developing countries, especially in China. China became the world's second largest oil consumer 
in 2003, and in 2013, it replaced the United States as the world's largest net oil importer. During 
the past decade, the international price of crude oil has traveled from $50 per barrel in 2005 to a 
peak of $146 in 2009 and subsequently descended again to below $50 in 2015. It's very interesting 
to know how the changes in crude oil prices have affected the economy in China, and in particular 
whether the change in China's exchange rate policy has impacted this dynamic. Current studies 
include but are not limited to: Cong et al. (2008) investigate the interactive relationships between 
oil price shocks and Chinese stock market using multivariate vector auto-regression. They consider 
different stock indices and both world oil price shocks and China oil price shocks. They find that 
oil price shocks do not show statistically significant impact on the real stock returns of most 
Chinese stock market indices, except for manufacturing index and some oil companies. Both the 
world oil price shocks and China oil price shocks can explain much more than interest rates for 
manufacturing index. Li et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between oil prices and the 
Chinese stock market at the sector level. They confirm a panel cointegration relationship between 
oil prices and stock prices and find that the real oil price has a positive effect on stock market in 
the long run. Huang and Guo (2007) construct a four-dimensional structural VAR model, and find 
that real oil price shocks would lead to a minor appreciation of the long-term real exchange rate. 
The goal of this paper is to fill an important gap in the literature by empirically investigating 
short-run and long-run relationship in a system of international crude oil price, Chinese stock 
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market, currency market and other economic activities, but from a new angle -- we mainly want 
to compare different dynamics before and after the exchange rate regime shift in 2005. China's 
foray into the market economy started after the initiation of the reform and opening up policy in 
1978. It is at this time that China's GDP started to see growth rates above 8% per year1. The de-
regulation since late 1970s has been gradual enough that the Chinese economy is still controlled 
by the government to a large degree. In particular China's central bank is not independent of the 
government, unlike the Federal Reserve in the U.S.2 As a result the China's central bank is charged 
primarily with preventing appreciation of the Chinese yuan (China's official currency) while 
avoiding severe effects on the rest of the economy. Up until the summer of 2005, the exchange 
rate of the yuan was measured purely against the dollar. After that time, the yuan has been 
compared to an undisclosed index of currencies, which has allowed the yuan to appreciate against 
the U.S. dollar. In this paper we choose to focus on the mid 1990's through 2014 and want to obtain 
a detailed picture of the dynamics of the economy to learn in detail how these dynamics are 
affected by the policy change in 2005. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the choices of data. 
Section 3.3 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 3.4 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Zhu (2012) for a detailed analysis. 
 
2 See Moskow and Lemieux (2008) for an excellent discussion. 
83 
 
3.2 The data 
 
3.2.1 Choices of variables and time period 
Broadly speaking, the initial goal of this paper was to analyze the changes brought to the 
Chinese economy by the change in exchange rate policy that occurred in 2005. This leads to two 
important questions: which variables should be used to describe the economy and what is the 
relevant time period. 
When dealing with developed economies, the standard approach to the second question is 
to utilize all available data. With a rapidly changing country like China, this approach is 
problematic, as major reforms to the political and economic system are frequent. We are choosing 
to start looking at data from January 1996 onwards. The reason for the choice is that the late 1980s 
and early 1990s saw major liberalizations in China, from the lifting of price controls, trade 
restrictions and other regulations, to large scale privatization of state industries. The precise cut-
off date that should be used is not obvious, as we are hoping to avoid transition effects while still 
having a reasonable amount of data available. Eventually we chose January 1996 as our starting 
date because by then inflation and hence real interest rates seem to have stabilized. For the end of 
the example we chose December 2014. We had the option of including one additional year of data, 
but the Chinese stock indices started rising rapidly at the beginning of 2014, and by early 2015 
concerns about a crash were rising. This led to the Chinese government implementing many brand 
new interventions in the stock market in the hope of softening the landing (see Figure 3.1). As a 
result, we are yet again faced with a changing paradigm of policy and therefore choose to end the 
data in December of 2014. 
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The next choice to be made was which variables to include in the analysis. Multiple 
considerations are at play here. A primary restriction is that we cannot hope to identify a model 
with a significant number of endogenous variables. Pulling in the opposite direction is that fact 
that most economic variables will be in some way connected to exchange rate. We attempted to 
strike a balance on this issue, while being well aware that no two economists would likely come 
up with the same set of variables. The first variable we included is the oil price measured in yuan. 
Since the exchange rate used to be pinned to the US dollar prior to 2005, any price changes in oil 
were carried directly in the Chinese economy. After the exchange rate has been allowed to vary, it 
is likely that price changes in oil no longer are having a one for one impact. Therefore, the 
importance of the oil price as a direct determinant for various aspects of the Chinese macro 
economy is like to have been reduced. Secondly we wish to incorporate a measure of overall 
activity in the Chinese economy. While GDP is frequently used in this capacity, we decided to use 
 
 
Figure 3.1. China stock market and policies from Nov 2014 to Aug 2015 
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industrial production.3 There were several reasons for this choice. We would expect industrial 
production to be directly impacted by changes in oil price, but also by changes in the exchange 
rate because China is so closely linked to the rest of the world in terms of trade. The GDP is likely 
to incorporate many other relations less directly linked to the international prices. In addition, GDP 
is available only quarterly, while industrial production is available on a monthly basis. We also 
include the stock price because there is evidence in the literature (see section 3.1) that it is closely 
linked to oil prices and furthermore it seems natural that as industry has been privatized the stock 
market index should be linked to industrial production. Finally, we include the interest rate, as it 
is an indicator for alternative means of investment as well as the cost of borrowing for industry, 
and finally we include the exchange rate. 
 
3.2.2 Description of the data 
Following the literature, we are using real data as opposed to nominal. This choice implies 
that the exchange rate before 2005 is not fixed, but it is essentially a measure of inflation. The 
Chinese stock market is indicated by the monthly average value of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) Composite Index, divided by the monthly CPI of China. The industrial production data is 
taken from the national Bureau of Statistics of China, measured as real growth rate (same month 
last year = 100).4 The exchange rate is the growth rate of real exchange rate between US dollar 
                                                 
3 Thank Lutz Kilian for suggestion. 
 
4 We wanted to use the industrial production level to measure the performance of Chinese economic activity. 
However, after 2006 the level data are no longer released by China's National Bureau of Statistics. And since 2011, 
enterprises above designated size was changed from 5 million (revenue from principal business) to 20 million, 
which makes the level data non-comparable. Also, the data on growth rate are released as year-on-year percent 
change. The underlying index series is not released. Therefore, we cannot calculate the month-to-month changes. 
Thank Min Wang and Xin Li for suggestion. 
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and Chinese yuan. For the crude oil prices, we first take the data of Europe Brent spot price FOB 
measured in dollars per barrel from the website of Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
(http://www.eia.gov), and then use the real exchange rate to adjust real (dollar) price of oil to 
obtain real oil price in yuan.5 For the interest rate, we use the one-year loan real interest rate. All 
variables except for the industry production growth rate are seasonally adjusted.6 Following the 
literature, the oil price and the stock index are analyzed with a logarithmic transformation. 
Graphical representations of the data series are presented in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. 
 
                                                 
5 Since 2011, there has been a widening of the spread between the WTI and Brent prices, with WTI oil trading at a 
discount, reflecting a local glut of light sweet crude oil in the central United States driven by increased U.S. shale oil 
production. As a result, the WTI price of crude oil is no longer a representative for the price of oil in global markets, 
and it has become common to use the price of Brent crude oil as a proxy for the world price in recent years. (see 
Kilian 2016) 
 
6 The industrial production growth rate is measured as a year-on-year percent change, so we don't need to do 
seasonal adjustment on it. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Graphical representation of the nominal data 
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3.3 Empirical Results 
 
3.3.1 Initial data analysis 
To compare different dynamics before and after the exchange rate regime shift in July 
2005, we divide the whole sample into two segments, one from January 1996 to July 2005, and 
the other from August 2005 to December 2014. Before proceeding to VAR modelling and impulse 
response analysis, we take a closer look at the individual series. In this analysis, we attempt to get 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Graphical representation of the real data 
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a handle on trends, stationarity and breaks. This is made harder by the fact that there are no methods 
available which handle all three issues together, even though there is an abundance of methods 
looking at these issues in a pairwise manner. As a result, we choose to only incorporate those 
breaks which are clearly present in the data and backed up by knowledge of economic events 
causing them. Taking these as given we will proceed to examine the trend structure of the data 
series. 
An initial visual examination suggests that there is a break in 2001 for the stock index and 
a break around 2008 for crude oil price and stock index. The one in 2001 was consistent with the 
fact that at that time the Chinese government issued rules requiring listed firms to sell some state 
shares in IPOs and additional share offers, and give the money to the national pension fund, which 
sparked a four-year stock market slump. The break in 2008 is consistent with the Great Recession. 
We take these as given as we proceed. 
To identify the trend structure, we apply the trend test of Perron and Yabu (2009a) which 
is valid regardless of whether or not the series is stationary. The method is described in detail in 
the appendix. The results are reported in Table 3.1. The trend tests suggest that there is no time 
trend for any of the variables in each subsample, and we can now proceed to test for unit roots. 7 
Table 3.2 presents the results for unit root tests. For stock index in the first subsample, we 
include a break in June 2001. For stock index and oil price in the second subsample, we include a 
break in December 2008. For these three series, we apply the unit root test with breaks which 
follows the basic framework outlined in Perron (1989). The critical values are taken from Perron  
                                                 
7 If we take into account of the breaks in 2001 and 2008, the "no trend" results still hold for stock and oil in the 
second subsample. But the test suggests a time trend exists and changes at 2001 for stock in the first subsample. 
However, this is not going to change the results of unit root tests. 
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and Vogelsang (1993)8. For other series, the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is 
applied. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1996). In both cases, the modified Akaike 
criterion (MAIC) is used to select the lag length. 
The unit root tests suggest all three series are ( )1I . We are now ready to proceed to 
multivariate modelling of the system. 
 
3.3.2 VAR model 
Initially we estimate a reduced for VAR model in levels for the two separate time periods. 
Here we do not include the breaks as we are hoping to obtain a model which to some degree 
explains and maps out the consequence of these economic events. We use Maximum Likelihood 
to estimate the VAR and then proceed to test for the number of cointegration relationships using 
the Johansen's (1988, 1996) trace test. When we fit the VAR model in the levels of the data, we 
                                                 
8 There was an error in one of the key tables of critical values in Perron (1989), and this was later corrected by 
Perron and Vogelsang (1993). 
Table 3.1. Trend test 
 
1996M1-2005M7    
  ln_stock industry_growth ln_oil exchange_growth interest 
slope 0.0048 0.0342 0.0085 -0.0011 -0.0115 
t-stat 0.6424 0.3617 1.0656 -0.2302 -0.1853 
      
2005M8-2014M12    
  ln_stock industry_growth ln_oil exchange_growth interest 
slope 0.0061 -0.0723 -0.0040 0.0137 -0.0080 
t-stat 0.5325 -0.5709 -0.3869 1.0364 -0.0814 
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use the usual information criteria to determine the optimal maximum lag length. We also test for 
serial independence of the errors using LM tests. The requirement for serial independence suggests 
setting 5p =  for the first subsample and 3p =  for the second. We report the results in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.2. Unit root test 
       
Level        
Series Time trend Breaks t-Statistic 0.01 0.05 0.1 
1996M1-
2005M7 
ln_stock no 2001/06 -2.30 4.43 3.76 3.47 
industry_growth no no -1.65 3.49 2.89 2.58 
ln_oil no no -0.47 3.49 2.89 2.58 
exchange_growth no no -2.47 3.49 2.89 2.58 
interest no no -1.24 3.49 2.89 2.58 
2005M8-
2014M12 
ln_stock no 2008/12 -2.21 4.35 3.73 3.45 
industry_growth no no -1.83 3.49 2.89 2.58 
ln_oil no 2008/12 -1.85 4.35 3.73 3.45 
exchange_growth no no -2.00 3.49 2.89 2.58 
interest no no -2.18 3.49 2.89 2.58 
        
First difference       
Series Time trend Breaks t-Statistic 0.01 0.05 0.1 
1996M1-
2005M7 
D(ln_stock) no no 7.85*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(industry_growth) no no 10.57*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(ln_oil) no no -1.82* 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(exchange_growth) no no 15.80*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(interest) no no 16.56*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
2005M8-
2014M12 
D(ln_stock) no no -2.50** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(industry_growth) no no 9.21*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(ln_oil) no no 4.92*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(exchange_growth) no no 16.28*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
D(interest) no no 22.18*** 2.59 1.94 1.61 
        
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%  level. 
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In each segment, it shows the existence of two cointegrating vectors with the trace test. At 
this high level at least, there does not seem to be a change in the model due to the 2005 policy 
change. Given the short time span of our data (approximately 9 years) we do not explore the long 
run relationship in any greater detail and proceed to examine short run dynamics. 
 
3.3.3 Impulse response functions 
Besides the long run equilibrium relationship, we are also interested in the short run 
dynamics between these variables. More specifically, we want to use the impulse response function 
to capture the effects of a positive shock from one variable to other variables. In this section, we 
use two methods to calculate the impulse response functions. The first one is the traditional 
Table 3.3 Cointegration test 
 
 1996M1-2005M7   
Hypothesis Eigenvalue LR 0.05 Critical Value Prob. 
r=0 0.30 97.08 76.97 0.00 
r≤1 0.27 58.32 54.08 0.02 
r≤2 0.12 23.16 35.19 0.52 
r≤3 0.06 8.63 20.26 0.77 
r≤4 0.02 2.31 9.16 0.72 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 5% level.  
     
2005M8-2014M12   
Hypothesis Eigenvalue LR 0.05 Critical Value Prob. 
r=0 0.36 109.96 76.97 0.00 
r≤1 0.23 60.71 54.08 0.01 
r≤2 0.17 31.92 35.19 0.11 
r≤3 0.06 11.34 20.26 0.51 
r≤4 0.04 4.32 9.16 0.37 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 5% level.  
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method, which includes estimating a structural VAR model and then finding the impulse responses 
from that model. The second method is the local-projection estimation in Jorda (2005), which 
doesn't require any specifications on the model. 
 
3.3.3.1 Identification of the structural VAR model 
The reduced form VAR is given by 
1
,
p
t i t i t
i
y c A y e−
=
= + +∑  
where ( )ln_stock, industry_growth, ln_oil, exchange_growth, interest 'ty = , c  is a vector of 
constants, p  is the number of lags, { } 1
p
i i
A
=
 are the 5 5×  parameter coefficient matrices, and te  is 
a vector of error terms. Let ( )t tE e e′=∑  be the residual covariance matrix. Following Amisano 
and Giannini (1997), the errors of the structural SVAR model can be written as: 
t tAe Bu=  
where tu  is a vector of length  5k = , and represents the unobserved structural innovations. tu  is 
assumed to be orthonormal, that is, its covariance matrix is an identity matrix, ( )t tE u u I′ = . A  and 
B  are 5 5×  matrices to be estimated. Here in our model, we only add short-run restrictions on 
contemporaneous relationship but no long-run restrictions.9 Based on economic intuition, we 
impose the following restrictions to obtain identification: 
                                                 
9 Christiano et al. (2007) point out that structural VARs based on short-run restrictions perform well. 
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We assume B  to be an identity matrix, which means the SVAR considered has instantaneously 
uncorrelated residuals, that is, the structural shocks hitting the system are assumed to be mutually 
uncorrelated. The restrictions on A  are motivated as follows. 
(1) We allow stock index to contemporaneously react to shocks of oil price, exchange rate 
and interest rate, but not the industrial production in the same month. This is because financial 
markets usually react quickly to the shocks in other markets and there is no delay for the 
adjustment. For example, a decrease in the real interest rate will encourage people to invest in the 
stock market and make the stock index increase. An appreciation of Chinese yuan along with 
speculative capital inflows will also flourish the stock market. And a shock from oil price will 
affect the price of energy based equities. It's unlikely that the stock price reacts immediately within 
the same month with a change to the industrial production growth rate because usually the 
performance in the industrial production sectors cannot be accessed by the public until the 
government releases the report. And this argument applies to other equations. Of course, lagged 
values of industrial production growth rate are allowed to have effects on other variables in the 
system after the government releases the reports. 
(2) The industrial production growth rate is allowed to be affected contemporaneously by 
oil price, exchange rate and interest rate. Crude oil is the most important energy sources used in 
production, and the interest rate affects the amount of capital that can be used in the production. 
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(3) The equation for oil price takes international crude oil price as being 
contemporaneously exogenous to the other variables in the system except for the exchange rate. 
We assume that oil price in dollar does not contemporaneously react to shocks to other variables 
in the system within a month -- it is determined by the global supply and demand of crude oil. In 
our model, since we measure the oil price in Chinese yuan, the price will definitely react 
immediately within the same month to a change to the real exchange rate. 
(4) Changes in oil prices and interest rate result in a contemporaneous change in the real 
exchange rate. A shock to the interest rate may cause the instantaneous inflows or outflows of the 
speculative money, and thus affect the exchange rate and the exchange rate may change to soften 
the impact of changing oil prices. 
(5) In the last equation, the real interest rate is allowed to react contemporaneously to an 
exchange rate shock. 
We calculate impulse response functions and confidence intervals using the vars package 
in R. The confidence intervals provided in the package are known to have poor coverage (see 
Pesavento and Rossi 2007) and they are wide enough that, if taken seriously, there are hardly any 
significant impulse responses. It is not clear, however that a more suitable method exists for a 
structural VAR where the variables might be unit root processes. The most promising might be 
Pesavento and Rossi (2006) but these are only valid for long horizons, in our case 10 or more 
periods ahead, which is not useful for this application. Another problem with this standard two-
step procedure is that it is justified only if the model coincides with the DGP, which is usually 
unknown. 
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3.3.3.2 Local-projection IRFs 
Jorda (2005) introduces a method to compute impulse responses without specification and 
estimation of the underlying multivariate dynamic system. The central idea is estimating local 
projections at each period of interest. A brief description of their model is in the following. 
The impulse responses are defined as the difference between two forecasts: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , | ; | 0; , 0,1, 2,...i t s t i t t s t tIR t s d E y v d X E y v X s+ += = − = =   (3.1) 
where ty  is an 1n×  vector ( 5n =  in our model); ( )1 2, ,... 't t tX y y− −= , tv  is the 1n×  vector of 
reduced-form disturbances; and D  is an n n×  matrix, whose columns id  contain the relevant 
experimental shocks. 
Run the regression10 
 1 1 11 1 2 2 ... , 0,1, 2,...,
s s s s s
t s t t p t p t sy B y B y B y u s hα
+ + +
+ − − − += + + + + + =   (3.2)  
where sα  is an 1n×  vector of constants, and 1siB
+  are matrices of coefficients for each lag i  and 
horizon 1s + . The collection of h  regressions in (3.2) is denoted as local projections. Then the 
impulse responses from the local-linear projections in (3.2) are 
 ( ) 1, , , 0,1, 2,...,si iIR t s d B d s h= =  
with the normalization 01B I= . 
Impulse responses can be calculated by univariate regression methods with a 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust estimator, with little loss of efficiency. Valid 
                                                 
10 Jorda (2005) points out that consistency does not require that the sequence of h  system regressions in (3.2) be 
estimated jointly -- the impulse response for the j th variable in ty  can be estimated by a univariate regression of 
jty  onto tX . He also points out that the maximum lag p  (which is determined by information criteria) need not be 
common to each horizon s . 
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inference for local projection impulse responses can be obtained with HAC robust standard errors. 
For example, let 

L∑  be the estimated HAC, variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients 1
sB  in 
expression (3.2); then a 95% confidence interval for each element of the impulse response at time     
can be constructed approximately as 
( )1.96 ' Li id d× ∑ . 
 
3.3.3.3 Discussions 
We find that the standard IRFs indicate statistically insignificant effects in most of the 
cases. 11 In this section, we mainly rely on the results by local-projection methods and focus on the 
effects from shocks on stock market, oil price and currency market, which is the main interest of 
the paper. 
A positive stock price shock causes a statistically significant increase on itself, and the 
shocks dissipate more rapidly in the sample after 2005 (Figure 3.4). We also find a positive effect 
from stock market to the exchange rate for both subsamples. The effects before 2005 are moderate 
and it takes about 8 months to become insignificant. In contrast, after 2005 the effects are stronger 
but quickly dissipate (Figure 3.5). They all indicate that the financial market became more efficient 
with a flexible exchange rate regime. A positive shock in oil price has short significant effects on 
currency market and interest rate both before and after 2005 (Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7). The 
effects are stronger after 2005. Specifically, if the oil price increases, it causes a depreciation of 
yuan, and a decrease in interest rate. This is because when oil price increases, the demand for 
                                                 
11 Figures of all IRFs for both cases are available from the author upon request. In this paper we only report figures 
which are discussed in this section. 
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foreign currency increases, which makes the exchange rate increases.12 Also, the increasing cost 
depresses the production and makes the interest rate decrease. A positive shock in exchange rate 
(i.e., a depreciation in yuan) has a short significant effect on the interest rate and the effect is 
stronger before 2005 (Figure 3.8). A positive shock in interest rate has a short negative significant 
effect on exchange rate (yuan appreciates) (Figure 3.9). This is because when interest rate 
increases, the demand for yuan increases. 
                                                 
12 The exchange rate is measured as how much yuan can be traded for 1 US dollars, so the increase in exchange rate 
means yuan depreciation. 
  
 
Figure 3.4. IRF of shocks from stock index to stock index 
  
 
Figure 3.5. IRF of shocks from stock index to growth rate of exchange rate  
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Figure 3.6. IRF of shocks from oil price to growth rate of exchange rate 
  
 
Figure 3.7. IRF of shocks from oil price to interest rate 
  
 
Figure 3.8. IRF of shocks from growth rate of exchange rate to interest rate 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the long-run cointegrating relationship and short-run dynamics in 
a system of crude oil prices, Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, industrial production 
growth rate, real exchange rates and real interests rate for the period January 1996 to December 
2014. To figure out the effects of exchange rate regime shift in July 2005, we divide the whole 
sample to two periods, one from January 1996 to July 2005, and the other from August 2005 to 
December 2014. In each subsample, we use the newly developed Perron-Yabu trend test to 
examine the time trend properties without knowing whether the noise component is ( )0I  or ( )1 .I  
Johansen cointegration tests confirm two cointegrating equations among these five variables in 
each segment. Finally, we construct structural VAR models and compare impulse response 
functions in each subsample. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.9. IRF of shocks from interest rate to growth rate of exchange rate 
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APPENDIX 
TREND TEST 
 
To test for long-run cointegrating relationship, we first need to test for unit root, and it's 
important to know whether there is a time trend in each series. There is a large literature on trend 
test, most of which requires a stationary process. But in most of the cases, the noise component 
can be either ( )0I  or ( )1I  and that in general no a priori knowledge about this is available. Perron 
and Yabu (2009a) propose a test for the slope of a trend function when it is a priori unknown 
whether the series is trend-stationary or contains an autoregressive unit root. A brief description 
of their model is in the following. 
The data-generating process for a scalar random variable ty  is assumed to be 
1
' ,
.
t t t
t t t
y x u
u u eα −
= Ψ +
= +
 
for 1,...,t T= , where ( )2~ 0, ,te iid σ  ( )1, 'tx t= are deterministic components, and ( ), 'µ βΨ =  is 
unknown. Here 1 1α− < ≤ , so that both stationary and integrated errors are allowed. The null 
hypothesis is 0β = . The procedure is the following:13 
1. Detrend the data by OLS on 't t ty x u= Ψ +  to obtain the residuals ˆtu . 
2. Use ˆtu  to construct the weighted symmetric least-square (WSLS) estimate 

2 1
2 1 21
2 1
ˆ ˆ
.
ˆ ˆ
T
t t t
W T T
t tt t
u u
u T u
α = −−−
= =
∑=
+∑ ∑
 
An estimate of its variance is given by  
                                                 
13 See Perron and Yabu (2009a) Page 59. 
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
( )
( )( )
2
2 1
2 1 21
2 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ3
T
Wt t t
W T T
t tt t
u u
T u T u
α
σ
= −
−−
= =
−∑
=
− +∑ ∑
 
and the associated t-ratio for testing that 1α =  is 
( ) 1 /W W Wτ α σ= − . 
3. Get the truncated estimate 
  ( ) MU W W WCα α τ σ= +  , where 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1 1/21
1/2
if 
1 if 
1 if 1
0 if 1
W W pct
W W W W pct
W
W W W
W
T r K a a
C
T r r T a
r T
τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ
τ
τ τ τ
τ
−
−
−
−
− >

  − + + + − < ≤ = 
 − + − + < ≤ −  

 ≤ − +  
 
   

  

 
with r  the number of parameters estimated in the trend function, i.e., the number of elements in 
the vector Ψ , and ( ) ( )( )( )
21 pct p
pct pct p
r T I T
a I T
K τ
τ τ
+ − +
+ +
= , where 1pI = 14 and pctτ  is a percentile of the limiting 
distribution of  Wτ

 when 1α = . Here we choose 5a =  and 1.96pctτ = − , the median of the 
distribution of Wτ

 when 1α = , then 

MUα  is approximately median unbiased, in the sense that it 
is nearly unbiased when 1α <  and has a median of 1 when 1α = .15   
4. Apply the truncation 

 

1/2
1/2
, if 1
.
1, if 1
MU M
MS
M
T
T
α α
α
α
−
−
 − >= 
− ≤
 
                                                 
14 In the case of a general noise component with an ( )AR p  structure, pI  is the integer part of 12p+ . 
15 Perron and Yabu (2009a) also consider using 2.85pctτ = −  as suggested by Roy et al. (2004), which is 
approximately the 85th percentile of the distribution Wτ

 when 1α = . However, Perron and Yabu (2009a) also 
point out that 1.96pctτ = −  is in general preferable (higher power and good size) unless one is worried about 
facing a process with a strong negative moving-average component. So in this study, we choose 1.96pctτ = − . 
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5. Apply a GLS procedure with 

MSα  to obtain the estimates of the trend parameter β , that 
is, apply OLS to the regression 
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 ' ,  for  2,...,
'
MS MSt t t
t
L y L x e t T
y x u
α α− = − Ψ + =
= Ψ +
 
and construct the standard t-statistic which we shall demote by FStβ . 
